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Can we afford to allow a disproportionate  degree of mobility to a single element in an 
economic system which we leave extremely rigid in  several other respects? If there 
was  the  same mobility internationally in  all other respects as there  is nationally, it 
might be a different matter. But to introduce a mobile element, highly sensitive to 
outside influences, as a connected part of a machine of which the other parts are much 
more rigid, may invite breakages. 
John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money (1930) 
It is a common claim that the Bretton Woods system had no effective “adjust- 
ment mechanism.”  Thus, Yeager (1976, 404) asserts that “the IMF system 
lacks any ‘automatic’ international balancing mechanism.” Williamson (1983, 
343-44)  argues that the primary means of adjustment up to the  1960s was 
variation in the pace of trade and payments liberalization but that, once liber- 
alization had been substantially achieved, “[nlothing else took its place.” And 
Johnson (1970, 92-93)  pillories “the lack of an adequate adjustment mecha- 
nism, that is, a mechanism for adjusting international imbalances of payments 
toward equilibrium sufficiently rapidly as not to put intolerable strains on the 
willingness of central banks to supplement existing international reserves with 
additional credits, while not requiring countries to deflate or inflate their econ- 
omies beyond politically tolerable limits  .” 
Maurice Obstfeld is professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, a research 
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow of  the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research. 
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Any retrospective assessment of the adjustment mechanism operating-or 







Adjustment of  what? What external accounts were to be balanced? 
Adjustment to which level? What is the right definition of external balance 
or equilibrium in the historical context of Bretton Woods? 
Adjustment  by  which means? Was  there a natural  and  automatic adjust- 
ment mechanism? If so, what were its main channels,  and did it operate 
with sufficient power and speed to eliminate imbalances before  political 
or financing constraints began to bite? Was  discretionary policy a neces- 
sary accompaniment to adjustment, or did policy instead impede whatever 
natural equilibrating forces were present? 
Adjustment to which disturbances? Did the adjustment mechanism operate 
with  differential  efficiency depending on the source or size of  the  initial 
imbalance? 
Adjustment by whom? Did deficit and surplus countries face asymmetric 
pressures  toward  adjustment?  Did  the  two  main  reserve  centers-the 
United States and the United Kingdom-face  special constraints or priv- 
ileges? 
definitive response to all these questions would itself fill a thick volume, 
not just a slim chapter. In what follows, I therefore set myself the more modest 
goal of placing these questions within a unifying analytic context and present- 
ing some supporting evidence for my interpretations. 
I argue below that the celebrated trio of Bretton Woods problems-the  ad- 
justment  problem, the  liquidity  problem,  and the confidence problem  (see 
Machlup and Malkiel 1964)-not  only are inseparably connected but also are 
irrelevant  in  an  idealized  world  of  price  flexibility,  information  symmetry, 
nondistorting taxes, and full enforceability of commitments. These points are 
not new, but a preliminary  look at a hypothetical frictionless world yields a 
sharper understanding of the very real obstacles to smooth adjustment during 
Bretton Woods as well as a sense of the features of the postwar world economy 
that engendered those obstacles. 
The main obstacles were two: (i) inflexibility, particularly in the downward 
direction,  of wages and prices; (ii) a degree of  external capital mobility too 
low to provide governments with reliably  stabilizing liquidity inflows but at 
the  same time  high  enough  to threaten  foreign  reserves.  Given these  fac- 
tors,  the discretionary  escape clauses built  into the IMF Articles of  Agree- 
ment-the  adjustable  exchange-rate  peg  and  the  option  to  impede  cross- 
border capital  movement-undermined  government credibility and thereby 
promoted instability in international financial markets. As these markets be- 
came more efficient,  and as major governments,  at the same time, revealed 
themselves as unwilling or unable to maintain key systemic commitments, the 
system inevitably unraveled. 
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in general terms how the related problems of adjustment and liquidity arose in 
the historical context of  Bretton Woods. Section 4.2 underscores this discus- 
sion by describing the problems of adjustment, liquidity, and confidence in an 
imaginary world  free of  market frictions.  A brief  discussion of  adjustment 
mechanisms under the classical gold standard occupies section 4.3. Section 
4.4 then describes how the central economic and financial features of the post- 
war world  mandated rapid  adjustment for deficit countries and at the  same 
time made that adjustment difficult to achieve in many cases. The section also 
takes up the long-term implications of international differences in trend pro- 
ductivity growth under rigid nominal exchange rates. 
Probably the most powerful adjustment instrument available to IMF mem- 
bers  was  the realignment  option offered by  the IMF Articles’  fundamental 
disequilibrium  clause.  Section  4.5  examines  why  governments became  in- 
creasingly reluctant to exercise this option and why the United States sought 
all along to avoid devaluing the dollar in relation to nondollar currencies. 
The next two sections discuss some empirical evidence on rigidities in cap- 
ital and product markets during the Bretton Woods era. Section 4.6 presents 
evidence of imperfect,  but increasing, international capital mobility. Section 
4.7 conducts a preliminary empirical comparison of price rigidity during the 
1880-1914  gold standard period and during Bretton Woods. 
Were design flaws in the Bretton Woods adjustment mechanism responsible 
for its collapse,  or does the primary fault lie instead with government policy 
errors-with  the inept operation of  an otherwise sound system for managing 
international payments? Section 4.8  explores the implications of my analysis 
for  this  central  question.  While identifiable  policy  mistakes  certainly  oc- 
curred, the question of design versus operation is not really well posed.  A 
well-designed international payments system must recognize the incentives of 
member  governments  and  modify  those  incentives  to  deter  beggar-thy- 
neighbor behavior. Indeed, the fundamental intent of the founders of the Bret- 
ton Woods system was to achieve exactly that goal. Their success was incom- 
plete,  however,  and new  stresses became evident as world  capital markets 
evolved in the  1960s. Eventually,  the mismatch between  the system’s rules 
and the incentives of some major participants proved fatal. 
4.1  Adjustment and Liquidity in Historical Perspective 
Any  discussion  of  the  need  for and  mechanisms  of  external  adjustment 
must start by defining adjustment, along with the closely related concepts of 
international liquidity and conjidence. All three concepts have counterparts in 
the theory of banking. They are best understood with reference to a milieu in 
which markets for risks and credit function imperfectly, so that ready access 
to a sufficient supply of liquid means of payment becomes a prime aim of asset 
management. 
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picture of fragmented-indeed,  often paralyzed-national  financial markets. 
Apart from the U.S. and Canadian dollars, major currencies remained incon- 
vertible, and controls on financial transactions were rife. Political instability 
and an overhang of war debts were additional brakes to private capital flows. 
The twin institutions set up at Bretton Woods in 1944, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the IMF, had been designed, 
respectively, to help finance postwar investment needs and to provide loans to 
member countries endeavoring “to correct maladjustments in their balance of 
payments  without  resorting  to measures  destructive  of  national  or interna- 
tional prosperity.”’ But the scale of resources needed in the late 1940s went 
far beyond what these agencies could provide,  and U.S. Marshall Plan aid 
(1948-51),  on the order of  1 percent of U.S. GNP per year, played the key 
role in bridging recipients’ payments gaps.* 
IMF members were expected to eschew both discriminatory currency prac- 
tices and restrictions on current-account payments as well as to establish lim- 
ited  convertibility  of  their currencies.  Exceptions  were,  however,  the rule. 
Controls on capital movement were sanctioned quite explicitly in Article VI, 
Section 3, of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Section 1 of that article forbade 
using resources borrowed from the Fund “to meet a large or sustained outflow 
of  ~apital.”~  The  Fund’s  founders,  recalling  the  often  destabilizing  “hot 
money”  flows  of  the  interwar  period,  were  in  no  hurry  to  encourage  the 
growth of an efficient world capital market. 
Only in December 1958-far  later than most people would have guessed in 
1944-did  European  currencies  generally  become  externally  convertible 
(i.e., convertible by nonresidents) in current-account   transaction^.^ Prodded 
by the United States, and provided with loans of $3.75 billion from America 
and $1.25  billion from Canada, Britain had attempted,  on 15 July  1947, to 
return to external convertibility.  Massive private conversions of sterling bal- 
ances into gold and dollars forced the British authorities to abandon their ef- 
forts after little more than a month. Britain’s reversion to a complex and dis- 
criminatory set of sterling conversion arrangements was a blow to hopes that 
1. IMF Articles of Agreement, Article I(v), reproduced in Horsefield (1969, 3:185-214). 
2. Yeager (1976, 385) places the total of Marshall Plan aid through the end of  1951 at nearly 
$1  1.5 billion. “At its peak,” he writes, “the aid program was providing most recipient countries 
with additional goods and services worth only 3 or 4 percent of  their own total production.” These 
are very large numbers by the standard of common welfare-cost calculations. 
3. Although only the vaguest limits were placed on a member’s use of its own  gold and foreign- 
exchange reserves to finance capital outflows. 
4.  Most countries did not simultaneously institute internal (or resident) convertibility, i.e., the 
freedom for residents to convert domestic money into foreign exchange for current-account pur- 
poses. West Germany, already facing problematic reserve inflows, formally established converti- 
bility on capital as well as current account for residents and nonresidents. It is noteworthy that 
recent moves toward convertibility in the former Soviet bloc have emphasized internal converti- 
bility (see Williamson 1991). Absent trade restrictions, either form of  convertibility can play the 
vital role of  “importing” world relative prices for tradable goods. If the domestic currency is not 
internally convertible, however, domestic residents may have no legal way of getting their hands 
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the world as a whole would soon return to a market-based multilateral pay- 
ments mechanism.  With  its  expertise,  traditions,  and  location, London  in 
1947 would have been, as it is even now, the natural hub for a global convert- 
ible-currency system. The pace of international financial integration, and with 
it the potential for speculative capital flows, quickened after 1958. But, even 
by  197  1, national financial markets remained somewhat more insulated from 
external forces than they are today. 
Membership in the IMF entailed a central policy constraint: to prevent one’s 
exchange rate from moving more than  1 percent away from an  agreed par 
value relative to the  1 July  1944 gold content of  the U.S. dollar. Only “to 
correct a fundamental  disequilibrium”-a  term that was nowhere defined- 
could a member propose a parity change to the Fund (IMF, Articles of Agree- 
ment, Article IV, Section 5[a] [italics added]). 
With this background, one can better appreciate the requirements of exter- 
nal balance and adjustment in the context of the early Bretton Woods system. 
Countries on the whole lacked regular access to foreign sources of credit and 
therefore were constrained to lower levels of investment and higher levels of 
saving than probably would have prevailed with full private capital mobility. 
The implied limit to the feasible current-account deficit was only one conse- 
quence of  the credit rationing that  countries faced.  In  addition,  countries 
needed to have on hand a buffer stock of internationally liquid assets-essen- 
tially gold or dollars-available  to smooth consumption or stabilize invest- 
ment in the face of unexpected income shortfalls or deteriorations in trading 
opportunities. This type of behavior is familiar from models of precautionary 
money demand by  households and firms (Foley and Hellwig 1975; Bewley 
1983). Credit constraints grew less stark, but did not disappear, as the system 
evolved. 
The standard precautionary need for international liquidity was reinforced 
by  the obligation of  fixed exchange rates.s A country facing an excess flow 
supply of its currency in the foreign-exchange market might have no choice 
but to renege on its IMF parity and allow a depreciation. The sclerotic condi- 
tion of  domestic and world financial markets in the early postwar years en- 
sured that remedial policies would work with an uncertain lag to loosen the 
reserve constraint. A constant additional motive for holding a sizable reserve 
stock was to inspire confidence in the peg. This motive flowed directly from 
5. Pegging an exchange rate may or may not correspond to using reserves as a buffer, depending 
on the source of disturbance,  the degree of price flexibility in the economy, and the goals of the 
authorities. Under conditions of capital immobility and rigid money wages, a temporary down- 
ward shift in foreign demand will cause a fall in output and a flow reserve loss (a trade deficit) 
when the exchange rate is pegged. The reserve loss makes some contribution to smoothing de- 
mand: obviously consumption and investment are higher than they would be if the exchange rate 
remained fixed but imports were lower. Policymakers might, however, prefer to allow currency 
depreciation,  a choice that would raise foreign demand and smooth the volume of  output (and 
employment) at the cost of a loss in the terms of trade. The trade-offs are complex and involve the 
scope and efficiency of domestic insurance markets, the strains that unemployment compensation 
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the Bretton Woods ground rules, under which markets could never be certain 
when payments restrictions would be imposed or exchange parities  altered. 
Even limited speculative flows, operating through leads, lags, and similar ave- 
nues, could place governments under unwelcome pressure.  The confidence- 
building role of reserves (and of credit lines from central banks issuing con- 
vertible  currencies)  increased  in  importance  as  world  financial  linkages 
expanded during the later Bretton Woods years. 
The individual country’s need for an adequate stock of international liquid- 
ity, both  as a buffer and to peg  exchange rates,  motivates  the definition  of 
external equilibrium that is probably most relevant for the Bretton Woods pe- 
riod:  a target  on changes in  net government holdings of  a widely accepted 
international means of payment or of foreign assets quickly convertible into 
such at low cost. Even this definition is incomplete, as it does not account for 
the possibility  that certain private  liabilities to foreigners rapidly  become a 
direct or an indirect drain on government reserves. Thus, to focus on what is 
essentially the official settlements balance is to highlight  a very inexact but 
nonetheless  informative  measure  of  the change in a government’s  liquidity 
position. 
The emphasis on liquidity and the adjustment of liquid asset stocks should 
not obscure the basic point that, in an ideal world, the purpose of  all interna- 
tional trade, whether in goods and services, in assets, or over time (i.e., in 
dated goods and services), is to exploit the potential gains afforded by differ- 
ences in preferences,  endowments, or technologies.  From this perspective, a 
nation’s external balance could be identified with the optimal level of  its cur- 
rent account balance,  that is, the excess of national saving over domestic in- 
vestment that  maximizes  some national  intertemporal  social welfare  func- 
tion.’ Balance-of-payments  equilibrium in the sense of the last paragraph is in 
6. The old Department of Commerce definition of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit was 
motivated by the need for a broad view of the national authorities’ liquidity position. Accordingly, 
U.S. statistics, in those days, did not consider short-term private capital inflows or U.S. govern- 
ment foreign borrowing to be balance-of-payments credits, on the grounds that such lending could 
quickly be reversed. Aside from other well-known difficulties with this accounting convention and 
its rationale,  it probably understated the strength of  the U.S.  liquidity position. The Bernstein 
committee’s subsequent definition of  the balance ofpuyrnenrs,  which is now  standard,  is the 
change in U.S. foreign-exchange reserves less the increase in official foreign claims on the United 
States-the  official settlements balance (U.S. Bureau of the Budget 1965). Despite its virtues, the 
Bernstein committee definition also may mislead. For example, when a foreign central bank ac- 
quires a dollar deposit in New York, the U.S.  balance of payments falls by a dollar. But when the 
central bank deposits the same dollar in a London Eurobank, which then deposits the dollar in 
New  York,  the U.S. balance  of  payments does not  fall.  Yet  the two scenarios basically have 
identical implications for U.S. liquidity. 
Standard balance-of-payments statistics also do not report forward foreign-exchange commit- 
ments,  which are equivalent to sterilized sales of  foreign exchange and can represent massive 
claims against cash reserves. Hirsch (1969, 229) states that, “[iln Britain in 1964-6,  the authori- 
ties’ forward commitments may have exceeded the gross reserves even as shored up by I.M.F. and 
central banking credits.” 
7. This formulation implies that there is no canonical standard of optimal current-account bal- 
ance. The optimal investment rate is unique, but the “optimal” saving rate is very much a function 
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principle neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the more fundamen- 
tal  goal of  optimal current-account balance.  Rather, the need  for liquidity 
arises from inescapable trading frictions that, if  they are sufficiently severe, 
may sharply curtail the gains from international trade. 
To  a greater or lesser extent, liquidity is a prerequisite for trade, and we 
judge an international monetary system by its success in promoting socially 
productive transactions in home and foreign markets alike. The problems of 
international liquidity and adjustment that beset real economies in the Bretton 
Woods era can be placed  in relief by consideration  of  a hypothetical  ideal 
economy. 
4.2  A Benchmark Model Economy 
The benchmark world economy is one in which markets are complete and 
competitive, prices adjust instantaneously to clear those markets, information 
is complete  and  perfect,  and  private  contracts  can be costlessly  enforced. 
There is only one departure from the Arrow-Debreu assumptions: some fea- 
ture of  individuals’ preferences  or constraints induces them to hold monies 
that are issued  by national  governments. Money demand  is conventionally 
modeled in various ways, some of which imply a departure from the underly- 
ing Arrow-Debreu equilibrium when nominal interest rates are positive. In the 
present context, the “shoe-leather’’ inefficiency implied by a nonzero oppor- 
tunity cost of holding money is a second-order issue that will be ignored.* 
Governments are committed to a regime  of  fixed exchange rates, which 
could take one of several institutional forms. The precise form is relevant only 
because of  its possible implications  for the international distribution of  the 
seigniorage from money creation (Helpman 1981; Persson 1984). To be con- 
crete, and to capture features of Bretton Woods, I will imagine that there is a 
center country to whose currency all other central banks peg theirs. The center 
country holds its international reserves in the form of gold, while other coun- 
tries hold gold and interest-bearing  deposits denominated in the center cur- 
rency. 
Governments provide public goods and finance this expenditure with lump- 
sum taxes that may differ across income groups. There are no political ob- 
stacles to varying these levies. Distorting taxes are therefore not used. This 
feature, along with the flexibility of all prices (including wages), implies that 
reflects political institutions and historical factors. The statement in the text takes income distri- 
bution-i.e.,  the weights in the national social welfare function-as  given. 
8. It is hard not to feel uneasy about simply imposing a monetary “transactions technology” on 
an economy where a need to use money does not arise endogenously. Highly relevant problems 
that I have assumed away in this section, such as informational problems, obviously motivate the 
use of monies. Asserting that money is needed amounts to admitting that to some degree these 
problems exist. Unfortunately, and despite some recent advances, models of endogenous money 
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most standard motivations for nominal exchange-rate adjustment are absent. 
From the perspective of public finance, an unanticipated devaluation would 
act as a lump-sum tax on the government’s nominal liabilities, and a higher 
rate of anticipated devaluation  might augment the flow of  seigniorage. With 
alternative lump-sum  taxes available, however, these incentives  to alter ex- 
change rates are absent. From the perspective of private-sector resource allo- 
cation,  there  is  no  incentive  for  unexpected  realignments  that  offset  en- 
trenched distortions or for realignments that hasten relative-price adjustment. 
The main motivation to adjust exchange rates, in the present rarefied setup, 
would be to offset an excessive trend inflation rate in the center country. I have 
relegated this consideration to the ranks of second-order effects (although in- 
flation costs could be high in a world where markets and institutions are less 
perfect than I am assuming in this example). 
The absence of monitoring and enforceability problems implies that house- 
holds and firms can benefit to the maximum possible extent (given their en- 
dowments)  from the  available opportunities  to trade  internationally  across 
time and states of nature. Because intertemporal budget constraints are always 
honored by individuals and governments, and because the resource allocation 
is Pareto optimal, current-account imbalance is never problematic. This is not 
to deny that certain fiscal policies may alter the net foreign  asset stock and 
impoverish (or enrich) future generations to the benefit (or at the expense) of 
those currently alive. In the present setting, however, these possibilities raise 
questions of ethics rather than of economic efficiency. 
Finally, observe that, because households and governments are solvent at 
all dates and in all states of nature,  liquidity problems, which presuppose at 
least the possibility of insolvency, will not arise. Individuals needful of  means 
of payment can commit to repay their debts and thus can always obtain instan- 
taneous credit. Governments can do the same and need never intervene to help 
smooth out private-sector fluctuations. 
In particular, the commitment to fixed exchange rates has no implications 
about the need for international reserves. Any level of international reserves- 
including arbitrarily high negative levels-is  consistent with an exchange-rate 
peg, and the rate of change of the reserve stock (the balance of payments) has 
no  intrinsic  welfare  significance.  Only  the  government’s  general  solvency 
matters.9 
Because this last point is so important to understanding the adjustment and 
liquidity problems of the Bretton Woods era, it is worth underscoring it with 
a simple model.lo The center country is labeled America and the aggregate of 
noncenter countries Europe. America’s money supply M is backed by a stock 
of gold G,  valued at the dollar price PR,  and domestic credit D: 
(1)  M  = PgG  + D. 
9.  For a more detailed analysis, see Obstfeld (1986). 
10. For a similar model, see Swoboda and Genberg (1982). 209  The Adjustment Mechanism 
Europe’s money supply M* is backed by  gold G*, domestic credit D*, and 
interest-bearing dollar reserves E  Let E denote the price of the dollar in terms 
of Europe’s currency. Then 
(2)  M*  = EPgG*  + D*  + EF: 
Real money demand in America depends on the nominal interest rate and a 
vector k of real variables; the nominal interest rate, in turn, is the sum of the 
real interest rate r and the expected inflation rate IT. Under a credibly fixed 
nominal exchange rate, Europe’s nominal interest rate must equal America’s. 
With P  denoting America’s price level, monetary equilibrium in the center 
country can be expressed as 
(3)  MIP  = L(IT + r;  k). 
To  simplify matters, and with no loss in generality, I assume a stationary sit- 
uation in which the real exchange rate q = P*IEP is constant over time.” 
Under this assumption, IT  = IT*  (implying r  = r*),  so that monetary equilib- 
rium in Europe is described by 
(4)  M*IP*  = L*(IT  + r;  k*). 
In the classical setting of this section, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
real variables r,  k, and k*  are determined independently of  monetary ones. 
Monetary neutrality is an expository simplification, not a prerequisite for the 
conclusion that reserves are irrelevant. (Instead, as discussed below, the cru- 
cial ingredient is perfect international capital mobility.) But, given neutrality, 
equations (1  )-(4)  lead to some illuminating conclusions. 
Suppose, to start, that  Europe holds  all its reserves in dollar assets and 
never trades them to America for gold.’* Equations (1)  and  (3) imply that 
American monetary conditions are insulated from European monetary condi- 
tions: the American price level P, American inflation IT, and the world nominal 
interest rate are set entirely in the American money market (given the under- 
lying  real  equilibrium).  Since  q  is  determined on  the  model’s  real  side, 
P*  = q  x  E  x  P is also independent of European monetary conditions. 
Now combine (2) and (4) to obtain 
(5)  EPgG*  + D*  + EF  = P*  X  L*(IT  + r;k*). 
The key point is that the right-hand side of  (5) is independent of  European 
monetary policy; and this implies that the left-hand side of  (5) is a residual 
variable of the model. To fix the exchange rate, Europe must adjust its mone- 
tary base to accommodate the equilibrium established in goods markets and 
the American money market. Europe has full discretion only over the compo- 
1 I. All the conclusions derived below would still follow in the nonstationary version of this 
12. Bretton Woods rules obliged the United States to redeem foreign official dollar holdings for 
model, provided the real exchange rate’s path remained independent of purely monetary factors. 
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sition  of  its  base-whether  to adjust through  transactions  in newly  mined 
gold, dollar reserves, or domestic assets. 
This discretion is of no consequence in the present setting. If Europe wants 
more reserves, a reduction in D*,  for example, through an open-market sale 
of  government  securities,  immediately  raises  dollar  reserves  by  an  equal 
amount if no gold is purchased.  Private Europeans short on cash merely bor- 
row foreign exchange abroad and sell it to their central bank for money. Amer- 
ica  undergoes  an  instantaneous  balance-of-payments  deficit,  Europe  an  in- 
stantaneous surplus, but the balance of indebtedness between the two regions 
does not change. 
Furthermore, commitment to a fixed exchange rate places no limit on the 
level of Europe’s reserves. The variable that must be set correctly is the total 
supply  of European  money.  Government  solvency  is the key  issue: foreign 
reserves  are only  a single component  of  government assets,  and  these  can 
decrease without bound provided other government assets increase commen- 
surately. If  solvency does not require seigniorage revenue beyond what is im- 
plied by the inflation rate that America chooses, there are no fiscal obstacles 
to prevent Europe from choosing a money-supply path consistent with a fixed 
exchange rate.  Obviously,  there can be no international reserve shortage in 
this kind of world, first, because there is no well-defined demand for interna- 
tional reserves and, second, because reserves are anyway in infinitely elastic 
An  assumption of perfect capital mobility, which  allows governments al- 
ways to borrow  reserves provided overall  solvency is maintained,  is behind 
the foregoing results. As noted above, the flexibility of prices is not critical. 
Even the standard Keynesian two-country,  mobile-capital model has a recur- 
sive structure in which European dollar reserves are a residual, accommodat- 
ing quantity, and that model therefore has implications about reserves identi- 
cal to those just derived. 
The analysis seems to imply, also, that changes in Europe’s dollar reserves 
due to shifts in  its money market  are of no consequence for America.  For 
example, a rise in Europe’s money demand, like a fall in its domestic credit, 
leads to a private capital inflow and an equal central bank outflow as Europe 
acquires  reserves  in  America.  The American  position  apparently  is  unaf- 
fected.  l4 
supply.  l3 
13. Notice that changes in reserves might be relevant, even with capital mobility, if all available 
taxes were distortionary. Open-market operations alter the currency composition of the govern- 
ment’s portfolio, and this change alters the government’s incentives to levy unexpected inflation 
taxes. 
14. In this vein, Kindleberger (1965) argued that U.S. payments deficits resulting from liquidity 
imbalances in foreign money markets were not an indication of dollar weakness. Notice that the 
change described in the text does affect Europe’s fiscal position. The stock increase in real money 
demand yields seigniorage revenue; by  pegging the exchange rate, the government spends this 
revenue to acquire interest-bearing foreign assets. Were the European currency allowed to appre- 
ciate instead, the seigniorage revenue would be returned to the public in the form of a negative 
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But does this shift not reduce confidence in the real value of  the reserve 
assets supplied by America? In his classic critique of the Bretton Woods sys- 
tem, Tiiffin (1960) argued that world dollar reserves could not grow forever 
on  a limited  base  of  U.S. gold.  Inevitably, nervous  foreign central banks 
would exercise their right to exchange dollars for gold, possibly initiating a 
reprise of  the  1931 sterling collapse. Assume in our model that America’s 
fiscal stance is consistent with a constant world price level. Can the system 
nonetheless collapse, simply because foreign dollar reserves are growing rel- 
ative to America’s gold stock? 
I would argue that, in a world of perfect capital mobility, the level of  F  is 
irrelevant to this issue as well. Notice first that an attempt by  Europe to ex- 
change dollar reserves for American gold brings about a fall in the world price 
level and therefore a multiple contraction in world dollar reserves:  l5 
dF  =  -(1  + M*/EM)PRdG* < -PpdG*. 
This multiple contraction in itself reduces the degree of reserve overhang. But 
more important is the finding that remaining dollar reserves increase in real 
value by the same percentage as official gold reserves. Central banks that ex- 
change dollars for gold are no better off. 
More fundamentally, Europe need not wait to attack until market forces 
push its reserves to  some trigger level; in principle,  it could  wipe out the 
American reserve stock at any moment simply by borrowing dollars and de- 
manding American gold. There is no  incentive to do so, and therefore no 
confidence problem, as long as America maintains the real value of the dol- 
lar.  l6 This it can do simply by controlling the domestic money supply.  l’ 
4.3  Credibility and Capital Mobility under the Gold Standard 
World  economic performance under the classical gold standard (roughly 
1880-1914)  differs from the idealized picture sketched in the last section. Yet 
in two crucial respects the gold standard had a coherence that contributed to a 
remarkably high  degree of  international economic integration and stability. 
First,  as  has  been  stressed by  Kindleberger (1973),  Bordo  and  Kydland 
(1990), and others, Britain provided firm and credible economic leadership 
based on fairly consistent free-trade principles. Second, international financial 
markets displayed a degree of resilience and efficiency that is impressive even 
by modem standards. 
15. For this calculation I hold  ‘TI  constant  and assume that America does not sterilize gold 
losses.  The first assumption  would  follow if  gold conversion did not alter America’s money 
growth rate. 
16. And as long as the official price of gold, Px, is not raised. In the present setting, however, 
there is no reason to raise this price. 
17. This result recalls Ricardo’s argument, paraphrased by  Harrod (1952, 2-3),  that, “to re- 
establish and maintain a gold standard, it was not desirable to collect a large gold reserve. The 
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These two factors behind the gold standard’s successes were not indepen- 
dent; on the contrary, they reinforced each other. Britain’s commitment to the 
gold convertibility of  sterling, its willingness to lend in crises, and its finan- 
cial expertise all facilitated international capital transfers of a magnitude that 
remains unrivaled.  In turn, capital mobility was a critical ingredient in the 
system’s adjustment mechanism, and it enabled the Bank of England in partic- 
ular to operate with a low level of gold reserves. According to Harrod (1952, 
3), “The free gold in the Bank of  England was usually of  the order of  f20 
million. It is instructive to compare this with the present reserve (September 
30th 1951) of &1,167  million, which is deemed to be so low as to spell perdi- 
tion. Even after allowing for the change in the value of gold, this present-day 
reserve is gigantic by nineteenth century standards.” 
Central banks  of other European  countries were unable to operate on so 
slender a base of gold. Latin America saw frequent lapses into inconvertible 
fiat money regimes. And even sterling was subject to confidence crises, as in 
the Baring panic of  1890. But as Eichengreen  (1989) observes,  by  the late 
nineteenth century an implicit international commitment to defend the gold 
standard had emerged. In the Baring crisis, for example, the Bank of England 
was able to arrange a large loan of  gold  from the Bank of  France and the 
government of Russia (Eichengreen 1989, 30; Giovannini 1989, 17). (In con- 
trast, the international Gold Pool, set up in 1961 to defend the $35.00 official 
price, disbanded in 1968. It left behind a two-tier setup under which the pri- 
vate gold price was free to rise without limit while the official price remained 
as a fictitious central bank transfer price.) 
Bordo and Kydland (1990) argue that the 1880-1914  gold standard system 
entailed  commitment  mechanisms  that,  despite  some lapses,  ensured  gold 
convertibility for most major currencies. One feature promoting adherence to 
the  standard was the  fear that departures  from convertibility might impede 
future access to world capital markets. The significant trade gains offered by 
those markets made this a heavy price to pay. Swiftly reacting capital markets 
provided a deterrent even to less blatant lapses from financial orthodoxy. 
The financial markets of  the gold standard era achieved levels of interna- 
tional capital transfer that have rarely been matched in postwar experience. 
Cairncross (1953, 3-4)  portrayed a vigorous stream of lending next to which 
the flows of the early postwar years were meager indeed: 
The forty or fifty years before  1914 was clearly an exceptional period  in 
economic history. It was symptomatic of the period that western Europe had 
invested abroad almost as much as the entire national wealth of Great Brit- 
ain, the leading industrial country, and a good deal more than the value of 
the capital physically located in Great Britain. It was also symptomatic that 
Britain herself  had invested abroad about as much as her entire industrial 
and commercial capital, excluding land, and that one-tenth of her national 
income came to her as interest on foreign investments. These conditions 
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the United States, they would imply American investments overseas of no 
less than $600 billion and an annual return on those investments of some 
$30 billion  (or the equivalent of the British  national  income).  Private in- 
vestment abroad, in recent years, has not exceeded $1 billion per annum, 
and even this total has only been sustained by very large investments under- 
taken by the American oil companies. But if the same proportion of Amer- 
ican resources were devoted to foreign investment as Britain devoted (out 
of  a far smaller national  income) in  1913, the  . . . entire Marshall  Plan 
would have to be camed out twice a year. The very extravagance of such a 
hypothesis shows how little there is in common between the perspectives of 
the Victorian era and those of to-day. 
Before World War  I, substantial resource  inflows financed  investment  in 
America, Argentina, Canada, and other rapidly  growing countries.  But pri- 
vate capital followed other routes as well. Japan, for example, was a major 
participant in the world capital market,  both as a borrower and as a lender. 
Figure 2a in Hayashi (1989) indicates that Japan was able to run a current- 
account deficit exceeding  10 percent of GNP during the Russo-Japanese War 
of  1905. (Foreign lenders, if not the Russian government,  probably  antici- 
pated  Japan’s victory.)  As  a nonbelligerent  during World War  I, Japan had 
large current-account  surpluses that peaked in  1917 at around  10 percent  of 
GNP. This number is several times the magnitude of Japan’s late twentieth- 
century surplus ratio. 
Evidence on asset-market arbitrage reinforces this picture of a capital mar- 
ket working surprisingly smoothly. Officer (1985) finds that, by the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-American gold standard link was 
extremely efficient: gold points were narrower than the Bretton Woods  1 per- 
cent parity bands, and exchange-rate variations from parity were on average 
well within the gold points. Officer attributes the strength of arbitrage in this 
market to technological innovations, such as the transatlantic cable (1866) and 
the introduction of steamship travel,  and to financial market developments, 
such as lower rates for insuring specie shipments.’* 
Early descriptions of the gold standard adjustment mechanism, epitomized 
by Hume’s classic account of  1752, left capital movements on the sidelines. 
Hume emphasized relative-price adjustment,  and its effect on the trade sur- 
plus,  in describing  how a balance-of-payments  disturbance is automatically 
corrected by market forces (see Hume 1985). According to this paradigm, an 
excessive domestic stock of precious metals raises commodity prices via the 
quantity theory of money and weakens the competitive position of a country’s 
tradable sectors. The resulting imbalance sets off  Hume’s adjustment mecha- 
18. Officer (1986) concentrates on the period 1890-1908,  reaching similar results. Officer’s 
findings contradict some influential earlier studies, but  the  arguments he offers are convincing. 
Spiller and Wood  (1988) use a different approach to arrive at conclusions similar to Officer’s. 
Giovannini (chap. 2 in this volume) presents further evidence supporting the efficiency of  gold 
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nism. A higher trade deficit immediately begins to drain specie from the econ- 
omy,  pushing  domestic  prices  down.  Symmetrically,  foreign  competitors’ 
prices are pulled  up by the counterpart  specie inflows.  Over time the home 
country’s  continuing  terms-of-trade  deterioration  shrinks  the  balance-of- 
payments deficit to zero, and at this point the international redistribution  of 
specie comes to a halt. l9 
The empirical relevance of  Hume’s adjustment model has been questioned 
by  subsequent researchers.  But before turning to these criticisms, I want to 
stress that Hume’s purpose in writing his essay was as much political as scien- 
tific and that his adjustment mechanism is best understood as an example dem- 
onstrating a more general point. Hume was really arguing for the main conclu- 
sion of section 4.2-that  the level of international reserves is irrelevant-and 
inferring the corollary  that governments can only  damage national  welfare 
through mercantilistic restrictions on trade. Market mechanisms will automat- 
ically  ensure an adequate  supply and  international distribution of  liquidity; 
gold is not the only or even the most important component of national wealth; 
and the appropriate policy target for governments has nothing to do with inter- 
national reserve flows per se and everything to do with the optimality of the 
underlying real resource allocation: “A government has great reason to pre- 
serve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may safely trust 
to the course of  human affairs” (Hume 1985,48). 
Early empirical work on the gold standard, notably that of Taussig and his 
students,  found remarkably  little clear evidence that gold  flows played the 
central role in external adjustment predicted by Hume’s model. In particular, 
specie movements  in the British case were small relative  to the  volume of 
trade (see, e.g., Bordo 1984, app. C).  Trade volumes seemingly were adjust- 
ing to capital  transfers,  and capital  flows financing  trade imbalances,  with 
surprising ease. 
Writers on the gold standard after Hume had posited several modifications 
of his symmetrical  adjustment  mechanism that might explain these results. 
Most important, they observed that capital flows may be a natural concomitant 
to adjustment: for example, the specie outflow induced by a rise in imports 
raises domestic interest rates (perhaps incipiently), attracting a capital inflow 
that partially (or fully) offsets the specie loss. Another factor modifying the 
relevance of Hume’s mechanism,  at least by the end of the gold standard pe- 
riod, was the growing practice  of  holding foreign currencies  as official re- 
serves. 
It would lead too far afield to review in any detail the vast literature on the 
gold standard adjustment mechanism, including studies on the various author- 
ities’ observance or nonobservance  of supposed  “rules of the  game.”*O My 
main point is that, despite the prominence of Hume’s example, the reality of 
19. Hume mentions as another equilibrating mechanism the variation of exchange rates within 
20. For extensive references, see Bordo (1984), Eichengreen (1989), and, from an earlier era 
their gold points. 
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the late gold standard seems to have been that potential adjustment problems 
were overcome rather smoothly, without  large reserve movements, by  the 
main players. Crises, when the occurred, often were headed off  by  credible 
displays of central bank solidarity.*]  The picture that emerges is one in which 
international reserve movements on the whole accommodated developments 
in the real economy rather than constraining them.22  The prevailing liberal 
ideology, the  high  mobility  of  capital,  the  credibility of  the  key  central 
banks-and  perhaps a century of  comparative peace in  Europe-all  com- 
bined to create this favorable environment. Two world wars and the time of 
troubles they bracketed shattered it. 
4.4  The Postwar Adjustment Environment 
Postwar economic conditions made international balance-of-payments ad- 
justment a pressing matter for most countries yet, at the same time, a goal that 
could be difficult to achieve. Pressure to adjust came from factors described in 
section 4.1: precautionary asset accumulation and the obligation to peg ex- 
change rates. One obstacle was rigidity, particularly in the downward direc- 
tion, of wages and prices. Another was the limited capacity of international 
credit markets. The main tool of adjustment allowed by  the Bretton Woods 
agreement was the adjustable peg; countries also had the option of tightening 
capital controls.  Once convertibility was  restored,  the potential that  these 
tools would be used undermined policy credibility and prevented stabilizing 
cross-border capital flows from reliably providing adjusting countries with a 
breathing space. Market expectations were informed by the reality that post- 
war governments would be held politically accountable for maintaining high 
employment and growth. 
This section examines main aspects of  the international adjustment prob- 
lems that countries faced under Bretton Woods.  Section 4.4.1 reviews the 
options available for attaining external balance. Section 4.4.2 describes the 
asymmetric position of surplus countries. In section 4.4.3, I focus on the spe- 
cial position of the United States. Section 4.4.4 looks at the long-term ques- 
tion of the adjustment to secular productivity-growth differentials. 
4.4.1 
The efficiency of international capital markets and the flexibility of wages 
and prices are key factors in the postwar adjustment environment. Resilient 
capital markets helped buttress exchange-rate credibility under the gold stan- 
Maintaining External Balance: Options and Trade-offs 
2 I. For a case in which borrowing from private markets played a key role in allowing a currency 
to remain on gold, see Grilli’s (1990) study of the 1894-96 U.S. exchange-rate crisis. 
22. Triffin (1960, 31) writes, “Current discussions of  reserve requirements stress primarily the 
role of reserves in the cushioning of balance of payments deficits. . . . Such a concept would have 
been largely alien to nineteenth century writers, and did not indeed play any prominent role in 
either academic or policy analyses of  the problem until the second world war.  . . . They were 
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dard by providing necessary liquidity while imposing financial discipline; a 
similar phenomenon seemed to characterize the post-1989 phase of the Euro- 
pean Monetary System (EMS) until the September 1992 crisis showed again 
how  violently  markets  can turn  on  a  government  once the  primacy  of  its 
exchange-rate  commitment  becomes  doubtful.  World capital markets could 
not fulfill a stabilizing role in the early postwar years. Instead, official credits 
were supposed to aid countries to maintain both agreed exchange parities and 
the pace of trade liberalization. Section 4.6 below offers evidence that, despite 
a trend of growing financial integration, imperfect mobility persisted after the 
return to convertibility.  It is important to recognize that the process through 
which a country’s external liquidity and its government’s credibility interact 
is a circular one and that the relation between capital mobility and credibility 
may not always be monotonically  increasing. Limited capital mobility  may 
do little to aid a government in defending an exchange rate; if the underlying 
motives  for realigning are strong, even  limited  capital mobility  may  allow 
damaging destabilizing money flows. 
In theory, at least, limited price flexibility provides one of the major ratio- 
nales for exchange-rate adjustment. Numerous econometric studies conclude 
that,  in the postwar United States, wages and prices have been imperfectly 
responsive to cyclical pressures.  On two other questions central to an under- 
standing of the Bretton Woods system, however, there is less agreement. Did 
similar wage and price sluggishness characterize countries outside the United 
States during the  first twenty-five  postwar  years? And is there a persuasive 
case  for asserting  generally  that  wages  and  prices  were  more  sticky  after 
World War I1 than before World War I? 
In section 4.7 below, I summarize briefly the current debate on these ques- 
tions and develop some additional international evidence. The historical rec- 
ord indicates that wages and prices displayed considerable inertia even under 
the gold standard. There is an apparent increase in the rigidity of  some price 
indicators after World War 11, but the increase may be smaller, and less uni- 
versal, than is often imagined. 
Even if many countries’ wages and prices were only moderately less flex- 
ible after 1945 than under the classical gold standard, at least one drastic shift 
in the policy environment clearly had occurred. Postwar governments, unlike 
their pre- 1914 predecessors,  were politically responsible for (or even legally 
committed to) the maintenance  of high employment  and economic growth. 
Recognizing the primacy of domestic employment objectives, the founders of 
Bretton Woods hoped that IMF credits would allow countries to wait out tran- 
sitory  shocks  while  avoiding  the  uncertainty  and  possible  beggar-thy- 
neighbor effects of frequent exchange-rate changes. 
The  changing  economic  setting  was  reflected  in  a  new  generation  of 
Keynesian international-adjustment  models that placed  income and employ- 
ment determination at center stage. In these models, the main factor limiting 
imbalances was the multiplier process rather than relative-price  adjustments 
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import spending, softening the trade-balance effect of the initial disturbance. 
A rise in domestic absorption spills onto imports, raising foreign income and 
imports in its wake. Metzler (1948, 220) provides a revealing discussion of 
the new doctrines: “In the modern view, a country with a deficit in the balance 
of payments is likely to eliminate this deficit, in part at least, through a low 
level of income and employment. The conflict between domestic stability and 
international  equilibrium,  which  has  long been  a familiar part of  classical 
monetary theory, is thus shown to be much more important than had formerly 
been  supposed. In an unstable  world, the choice confronting an individual 
country is not merely between  price stability and international equilibrium, 
but between stability of employment and international equilibrium.” 
I have italicized  a crucial clause in this passage to prevent it from being 
misconstrued. Metzler was not suggesting here that additional forces, such as 
relative-price  changes, could make a noticeable contribution to adjustment. 
To his mind, both price rigidity and elasticity pessimism made this unlikely, 
except over the long run. Thus, Metzler continues, “the adjustment of a coun- 
try’s balance of payments by means of income movements is likely to be in- 
complete.’’ The new view “accounts for only part of the adjustment and thus 
constitutes a theory of disequilibrium as well as a theory of equilibrium.” This 
was a revolutionary  departure from classical  modes of thought.  No  strong 
forces were operating automatically to correct payments imbalances. A coun- 
try hit by a negative trade shock would experience an ongoing reserve hem- 
orrhage; it would then face an agonizing choice between stanching the flow at 
the cost of higher unemployment or sooner or later exhausting its reserves and 
foreign credit lines. 
This Keynesian paradigm differs not only as to the nature of the interna- 
tional  mechanism but  also  as to  the likely source of  problems.  Monetary 
shocks,  so central to Hume’s own thinking,  are not featured. In Metzler’s 
words (1948, 212), the monetary system “has been relegated to a somewhat 
secondary  position.”  Equally  secondary  are other  financial  market  distur- 
bances. Autonomous aggregate demand shocks, foreign as well as domestic, 
are the focus of attention. 
Subsequent writers, notably Meade (195 l),  reintegrated monetary factors 
into the Keynesian  open-economy model.  But their techniques were essen- 
tially static and thus could not fully address the possibility, raised by Metzler, 
of prolonged  or even perpetual  disequilibrium. Mundell  (1961) achieved a 
dynamic synthesis, showing that, even in a sticky-price model, an “income- 
specie-flow’’  mechanism  might  substitute  for  Hume’s  “price-specie-flow” 
mechanism and ensure a stable approach to external equilibrium.  According 
to Mundell, the gold losses accompanying a trade deficit would raise interest 
rates,  discouraging  absorption  and  reducing  the  deficit;  a  corresponding 
rise  in net  imports would  be occurring abroad. Assuming  a stable param- 
eter  configuration,  the  payments  imbalance would  ultimately  converge  to 
zero. Adding mobile  capital to the model only speeded and stabilized this 
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Mundell’s automatic adjustment mechanism, however, entails no automatic 
return to internal balance. If  the shock behind the initial deficit is a fall in 
world demand, a recession ensues; as reserves drain away,  driving interest 
rates higher, output falls further, and unemployment grows. Political realities 
are unlikely to leave the income-specie-flow mechanism enough time fully to 
unfold. This shortcoming led Mundell to examine additional policy weapons 
that might help push the economy simultaneously to internal and external bal- 
ance. His idea of an optimal “policy mix” (Mundell 1962) exploited the idea 
that fiscal expansion and monetary expansion have similar effects on output 
but divergent effects on interest rates and, hence, assuming sufficient capital 
mobility, on the balance of payments. Thus, fiscal policy can be assigned to 
preserve internal balance, while the money supply adjusts to a level consistent 
with balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
Despite its intellectual elegance, the theory of  the policy mix was almost 
completely impracticable. In a detailed study of the policies of nine industrial 
countries during the postwar period to the mid-l960s, Michaely (1971, 33) 
found only two episodes-one  each for the Netherlands and the United King- 
dom-in  which the policy-mix prescription was consistent with the authori- 
ties’ actions. Indeed, fiscal policy seemed to have been largely unresponsive 
to stabilization needs. “Most often,” Michaely  (1  97 1, 32) concluded, “bud- 
getary policy seems to be excluded from the list of  instruments available for 
the correction of domestic as well as balance-of-payments disequilibria.” 
There are several reasons why fiscal policy could not be deployed in the 
manner Mundell proposed. To  start, bureaucratic and legislative delays made 
it a cumbersome weapon. Leaving these issues aside, there was still the prob- 
lem that capital mobility might be insufficient to allow the policy mix to work. 
And capital flows might well behave perversely. The need for policy interven- 
tion would be greatest in the face of a permanent disturbance, such as a per- 
manent fall in foreign demand. But, in such cases, markets would anticipate 
the possibility of a parity change, and private capital would flow outward, not 
inward. As Triffin (1960, 33) observed, commenting on a more general phe- 
nomenon: “International flows of private capital can no longer be relied upon 
as a major source of  cushioning for current account disequilibria. Fears of 
currency depreciation and exchange restrictions often indeed tend to stimulate 
private capital flows from deficit countries to surplus countries, and to aggra- 
vate, rather than cushion, the impact of current account imbalance.” 
A fundamental problem was the possibility that an aggressive fiscal expan- 
sion would cause structural problems later on. Domestic investment might be 
crowded out. At the same time, a country borrowing abroad to maintain high 
employment and conserve reserves after an adverse demand shock would be 
building up a foreign debt to be serviced in the future. In the case of a perma- 
nent  shock, this might be  an  unwise strategy. Finally, the accumulation of 
government debt in the hands of the public could undermine government cred- 
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There is abundant evidence that at least some government officials were 
aware of the strain on policy credibility that a large public debt might engen- 
der. The French stabilization of 1958-59  involved deep budget cuts plus some 
significant confidence-building measures: an issue of  gold-indexed govern- 
ment debt and the restoration of external convertibility in step with other Eu- 
ropean countries (Yeager  1976, 476-77).  In the United Kingdom, a large 
public-sector debt sharply limited the room for maneuver of monetary policy. 
According to Goodhart (1973, 513), the debt was one of several factors that 
“gave the monetary authorities cause for concern about their ability to prevent 
a massive exodus of holders from long-term debt and an associated explosive 
increase in the money supply.” The worry to avoid the “twin disasters of inter- 
nal  and external collapse of the value of  the pound sterling” meant that the 
Bank of England could not have viewed fiscal expansion as an attractive re- 
sponse to payments deficits.23  The main point is a familiar one. An intertem- 
porally balanced government budget is a prime requirement of overall equilib- 
rium,  and  seemingly  unsustainable  fiscal  shifts  are  unlikely  to  be  well 
received by financial markets. This constraint limits the scope for activist fis- 
cal policy, particularly under a fixed exchange rate. 
The Keynesian assumption of  strict wage-price rigidity leads to a bleaker 
picture than was warranted in reality. Consider again a country that suffers a 
permanent fall in foreign demand for its goods. In the long run, this country’s 
terms of trade must fall, and, with a fixed exchange rate, the price change can 
be effected only through a fall in domestic prices and wages relative to for- 
eign. Domestic unemployment, and an unsterilized reserve drain, eventually 
can bring about the required price-level decline. Prices are more rigid down- 
ward than upward, however, and, in an environment of some secular inflation, 
appropriate relative price changes may take place, not through home defla- 
tion,  but  by  a  slowdown  in  home  inflation.  Furthermore,  secular labor- 
productivity growth  may  limit the need  for an  absolute decline in  money 
wages, as is discussed in section 4.4.4 below (see also Haberler 1970). 
In practice, then, the adjustment process was a race. Would these natural 
forces of  relative-price change work swiftly to restore internal and external 
equilibrium? Or would foreign reserves and political patience run out first? 
Fiscal policy  was in many cases disabled, and the use of  monetary policy 
posed a dilemma-whether  to move toward full employment at the cost of 
risking an external crisis.24  A country that could not preserve adequate growth 
23. The Labour government was not deterred, however, from adopting expansionary fiscal 
measures in 1967 (Artus 1975,626). 
24. Other tools of  policy were available, of course. These included changes in  the pace of 
external liberalization  (particularly before 1958), import restrictions, export subsidies, capital 
controls, forward exchange intervention, direct credit controls, influence over government-owned 
enterprises (including banks), industrial or “structural” policies, price controls, incomes policies, 
and all kinds of moral suasion. Trade policies were frowned on by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and invited retaliation; other policies had little capacity to bring about 
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and  full employment without  continually  hitting  its reserve  constraint was 
generally accepted to be in fundamental disequilibrium. 
This left the ultimate weapon,  devaluation. Devaluation has the advantage 
that it can bring about the needed relative-price change at a stroke, bypassing 
the need for an extended period of reserve loss and unemployment. (Appendix 
A presents a simple formal model of the adjustment process and devaluation.) 
But, in common with all capital levies, devaluation, when anticipated, leads 
to private behavior likely to undermine even a benevolent government’s aims. 
If the economy is relatively  free of financial leakages, an adjustable-peg sys- 
tem  may  work tolerably  well.  The possibility  of  open or disguised  capital 
outflows, however, can create violent instability. Fears that a government will 
block cross-border financial flows may lead to similar instability. 
It is noteworthy that almost every major devaluation of the Bretton Woods 
period  was instigated,  not by an authority’s cool-headed perception  that the 
economy was in fundamental disequilibrium, but by a foreign-reserve crisis.25 
Many of  these crises  were  set off,  of course, by  governments’ attempts to 
escape disequilibrium  through means other than devaluation. And  it is also 
true that several crises were  averted by shows of  central bank  solidarity  in 
which generous intergovernmental credits were extended.  But the bet could 
go only one way, and continuing balance-of-payments problems were certain 
to provoke future attacks on the currency in question. 
The devaluation option thus created severe problems of its own, and these 
grew acute as financial markets became more interdependent. For this reason 
(as I will argue in sec. 4.5 below), policymakers were increasingly reluctant 
to resort to realignment. As far as deficit countries are concerned, it is indeed 
no exaggeration to assert that the Bretton Woods system contained no reliable 
mechanism of adjustment. 
4.4.2  The Asymmetric Position of Surplus Countries 
Surplus countries were in a completely different position, in the first place 
because they faced no reserve constraint. Nothing in principle limited the vol- 
ume of reserves they could accumulate, and, to the extent that reserves could 
be  prevented  from affecting  prices  and  interest rates, adjustment could be 
postponed indefinitely.26  This central asymmetry in the Bretton Woods adjust- 
ment mechanism shifted a disproportionate burden to deficit countries. 
Germany’s example illustrates the absence of forces pushing surplus coun- 
tries toward balance-of-payments equilibrium. After a devaluation scare early 
in 195  1,  Germany embarked on a path of massive foreign reserve accumula- 
25. An exception was President Pompidou’s decision to devalue the franc in August 1969 “dur- 
ing a period of relative calm” (Yeager 1976,483.)  The devaluation followed President de Gaulle’s 
attempt to prop up the franc through restrictive macro policies and controls (November 1968), de 
Gaulle’s resignation (April 1969), and intense speculative outflows in favor of the deutsche mark 
(April-May  1969). See also Solomon (1982, chap. 9). 
26. For a theoretical study of the long-run dynamics implied by  sterilization in a model with 
imperfect international asset substitution, see Obstfeld (1980a). 221  The Adjustment Mechanism 
tion that continued, with only sporadic interruption, until the collapse of Bret- 
ton Woods. Had market forces been allowed to function freely, these surpluses 
would have pushed up Germany’s wages and prices, reducing competitiveness 
and future reserve inflows in the manner Hume had described. Sectoral pro- 
ductivity trends also argued for higher German inflation. But Germany was 
unwilling to accept it. Instead, reserve inflows were sterilized-mopped  up 
through open-market sales of  domestic securities or bottled up through in- 
creasing reserve requirements on domestic banks. 
Figure 4.1 plots the paths of  Germany’s international reserves (left axis) 
and M1  money supply (right axis), showing quarterly data from 1950:l to 
1971:2. (Appendix B contains a full description of all data used in this paper.) 
Until the late 1960s, there is no indication that reserve growth influences the 
money growth target. A number of  detailed econometric studies have con- 
firmed Germany’s high propensity to sterilize reserve  inflow^.^' Sterilization 
had an important magn$cation  effect on these flows since restrictive domestic 
monetary measures leave the interest rate higher than it otherwise would have 
been. Existing evidence shows, however, that world capital markets were not 
so perfect as to push this magnification effect to infinity, making sterilization 
infeasible.28  Germany also resorted to restrictions on capital inflows, such as 
prohibiting interest payments on deposits from abroad; these became more 
important as the speculative elasticity of capital inflows rose over the 1960s. 
Germany’s reserve growth slowed in the mid-1960s following a small re- 
valuation in 1961. The deutsche mark came under much heavier speculative 
pressure in 1968-69  than it had in 1961, and it was again revalued (and by a 
larger percentage) in October 1969. The action followed a brief interlude of 
floating. All during this period, controls on capital inflow escalated, but in 
May  1971 speculators nonetheless took up  the one-way bet and forced the 
German authorities to retreat for a second time to a floating rate. The float 
lasted until the ill-fated Smithsonian realignment of December. 
Germany’s experience shows how limited the incentives were for surplus 
countries to adjust. Her deficit-ridden trading partners arguably would have 
benefited from a smoother and more prompt adjustment in German competi- 
tiveness than the revaluations of the 1960s allowed. Sterilization and financial 
controls were the main devices allowing Germany to postpone for long peri- 
ods the choice between domestic inflation and revaluation. 
4.4.3 
As the main reserve-currency center, the United States derived certain ben- 
efits in adjusting and faced special problems. Here was another asymmetry in 
The U.S. Position and the Role of Gold 
27. For  surveys, see Michaely  (1971), Laney and  Willett (1982), and  Darby  et al. (1983). 
Sterilization was widespread and not confined to surplus countries. 
28. Set?, e.g.,  Hemng and Marston (1977) and Obstfeld (1980b). Studies in Darby et al. (1983) 
examine the question of monetary autonomy for Germany as well as other industrial  countries, 
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International reserves and money supply of the Federal Republic of 
the system’s adjustment mechanism.29  (Sterling’s much diminished world role 
implied smaller benefits, and more serious problems, for Britain.) In principle 
(see sec. 4.2  above), the United States faced no liquidity constraints. As long 
as foreign central banks were willing to accumulate more interest-bearing dol- 
lars, there was no natural limit to its official settlements deficit. This practice 
could also relieve the United States of the burden of adjusting its balance of 
payments: reverse official capital inflows automatically sterilized  U. S. defi- 
cits, forcing all necessary  price-level  adjustment onto others.  Furthermore, 
with U.S.  dollar liabilities elastically supplied and willingly held, no global 
liquidity shortage was p~ssible.~” 
The year  1949 is an early milestone in the Bretton Woods system. In Sep- 
tember, Britain’s 30.5 percent devaluation of sterling set off  a wave of deval- 
uations involving thirty-one countries.  31 Although the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950 unleashed  inflationary  forces that obscure the devaluation’s ef- 
fects, the early 1950s mark the end of the postwar “dollar shortage” and the 
start of  a period of  rapid growth in global dollar reserves.  As Kindleberger 
(1965) pointed out, much of this growth merely represented growth in foreign 
money demands-witness  the German example cited above-and  posed no 
objective  threat  to U.S. liquidity,  let  alone  solvency.  Indeed,  the  reserve 
growth was inevitable and healthy. Nervousness nonetheless set in by the late 
1950s, the result of continuing U.S. gold losses and continuing growth in the 
29. A further asymmetry was the dollar’s central role in the definition of par values. The need 
for a dollar devaluation relative to foreign currencies was not a contingency that the Articles of 
Agreement had clearly foreseen. In the December 1971 Smithsonian agreement, the dollar finally 
was devalued. 
30. The absence of a global liquidity shortage does not imply, of course, that individual  coun- 
tries will never face liquidity problems. 
31. Yeager (1976,445).  This figure does not include dependencies. 223  The Adjustment Mechanism 
country’s official short-term dollar liabilities. Central banks thought it prudent 
to diversify, to some extent, into gold. 
Waning  confidence, then,  was the factor placing a limit on U.S. deficits 
and, by  implication, on global reserve growth. Over the 1960s, the United 
States enacted a series of increasingly desperate restrictions on capital outflow 
in an  attempt to cure its payments deficit. To  the extent that these had any 
effect at all, they probably weakened the dollar’s international position. (Sim- 
ilarly, the United Kingdom’s 1957 decision to ban its banks from providing 
sterling finance for non-British trade served mostly to hasten that currency’s 
decline as an international money.) In practice, U.S. monetary policy became 
more responsive to the payments position, at least episodi~ally.~~ 
The United States had no statutory obligation to limit the extent of its offi- 
cial settlements deficits. A key systemic obligation, instead, was to prevent 
the price of  gold from rising above $35.00 dollars an  ounce, and this the 
United States could do by controlling its money supply, independently of the 
size of  its gold reserve. A full account of  gold’s role in  the Bretton Woods 
system would require (and is worth) a chapter of  its own. Here I can only 
summarize some of the key  development^.^^ 
In the early postwar years, private holding of gold remained illegal in many 
countries,  and  organized gold  markets,  including London’s,  were  closed. 
Black  markets functioned,  however,  and  unofficial  gold  prices  as  high  as 
$55.00 dollars an ounce are reported (Kriz 1952, 3). The London market re- 
opened in  1954 during a period of  weak gold prices. Prices remained stable 
until the decade’s end, but began rising in 1960. One month before the 1960 
U.S. presidential election, the London gold price reached $40.00 per ounce. 
Parity was restored by U.S. open-market sales, backed up by reassuring state- 
ments from the president-elect. In 1961, the United States organized the Gold 
Pool, which coordinated central bank gold intervention under a U.K. execu- 
tive. But in March 1968 the Gold Pool surrendered to speculative gold buying 
and simply severed the dollar’s link to the metal. Gold’s price was now free to 
rise in the private tier of  the market. 
In this way, the Bretton Woods system’s nominal anchor was jettisoned, just 
a few months after the November  1967  devaluation of  the pound. In retro- 
spect, the step was of immense significance. Even if the two-tier gold market 
did not signal a U.S. abnegation of its responsibility to safeguard the dollar’s 
real value, it demonstrated how easily the commitments of reserve-currency 
countries could be discarded. Diminishing confidence in authorities coupled 
32. Swoboda and Genberg (1982) present evidence that U.S. deficits were incompletely steri- 
lized. Giovannini (1989) finds that past U.S. deficits are correlated with the U.S. money-market 
interest rate. However, Michaely (1971,62) classifies the United States (along with Germany and 
Sweden) as a country in which “monetary policy does not appear to have been generally, or even 
mostly, responsive to the balance of payments.”  Michaely does not go beyond the mid-1960s. 
33. For detailed accounts, see Hirsch (1969, chap. 10). Solomon (1982, chaps. 7, 12), Yeager 
(1976, 425-28),  and Gold Commission (1982). 224  Maurice Obstfeld 
with a growing scope for international hot money movements proved to be an 
unstable mixture. The stage was set for the collapse of Bretton Woods. Trif- 
fin’s prophecy finally came to pass on 15 August 1971, when the U.S. discon- 
tinued gold sales to official buyers. 
4.4.4  Implications of Unbalanced Productivity Growth 
An assessment of adjustment mechanisms during the Bretton Woods period 
must recognize that differential national  trends  in productivity growth may 
necessitate trend differences in national inflation rates and long-term shifts in 
equilibrium real exchange rates. If the necessary price movements somehow 
are impeded while nominal exchange rates remain fixed, both external and 
internal  imbalances may result.  At the same time,  underlying productivity 
trends  help  determine  the  flexibility  of  an economy’s response  to various 
shocks-the  speed  with  which  the  long-run equilibrium  path  is regained. 
How did the system cope with the international and intersectoral productivity- 
growth differentials that inevitably arose? 
A useful analytic framework is a small flexible-price economy that pro- 
duces tradable and nontradable goods. Tradable-goods prices are determined 
in a world market, and all investment demand is assumed (for simplicity) to 
fall on tradables. Let IT  be the percentage rate of increase of the GDP deflator, 
IT; the world inflation rate for tradables, and u the weight of  nontradables in 
domestic product.  Let Y, and Y, denote real per capita outputs of  tradables 
and nontradables, let C,  and S  denote the per capita levels of tradables con- 
sumption and national saving, let E be the elasticity of consumption substitu- 
tion between tradables and nontradables, and let circumflexes (*) signify pro- 
portional changes.34  Then, under a fixed exchange rate, the inflation rate IT  is 
related to global inflation in tradable goods by 
a formula involving the growth differential between tradables  and nontrad- 
ables, the growth rate of national saving, and the national saving ratio. 
There is clearly  no need for trend inflation to be equal across countries, 
fixed exchange rates and the law of one price for tradables notwithstanding. 
For example,  it is plausible,  looking at (6),  that countries with the highest 
growth differentials in favor of tradables will also have the highest long-run 
inflation rates. The reason was explained by Balassa (1964), among 
A higher relative growth rate in tradables causes a greater ongoing incipient 
excess demand for nontradables;  quicker inflation in  the prices of  nontrad- 
34. I do not disaggregate the public and private sectors of the economy. 
35. Viner (1937, 3 15) paraphrases Ricardo’s observation that “non-transportable ‘home com- 
modities’ . . . would be higher in price in countries where the effectiveness of labor in export 
industries and therefore  also the wages of labor were comparatively high.” Ricardo’s account 
analyzes the “Balassa effect” from the perspective of the factor markets and the economy’s supply 
side. 225  The Adjustment Mechanism 
ables is the result. But notice that government policies that spur national sav- 
ing may temporarily slow the pace of price increases in nontradable~.~~  Even 
though the law of one price does not hold exactly for many tradable goods, 
the core message of  (6), that sectoral productivity-growth imbalances influ- 
ence the gap between countries’ trend  inflation rates under fixed exchange 
rates, remains valid. 
Data on international inflation differentials and productivity growth support 
this claim. Table 4.1 presents evidence on inflation rates and sectoral produc- 
tivity growth rates for the United States, Germany, and Japan. The table shows 
that the United States had the lowest average inflation rate of the three coun- 
tries over the period  1950-71;  Japan’s average rate was much higher, while 
Germany’s is not far above that in the United States. This inflation ranking is 
not surprising given equation (6) and the labor-productivity behavior summa- 
rized in the second part of table 4.1. An approximate identification of nontrad- 
ables with  services would  imply that Japan shows the sharpest differential 
between tradable and nontradable labor-productivity growth over the period 
1950-73;  Germany is next, followed by  the United States. To the extent that 
tradables are capital intensive compared with nontradables, the behavior of 
capital productivity, shown in the table’s last part, implies that the same rank- 
ing applies when intersectoral differences in total factor productivity growth 
are considered. 
The data in  table 4.1  underscore a first reason why  productivity trends 
might lead to external imbalance and eventual currency realignment. Given 
world inflation in tradables, the intersectoral productivity differential may im- 
ply  an  unacceptably high  domestic  inflation  rate.  Japan  readily  accepted 
higher inflation, but Germany did not:  despite a much higher intersectoral 
productivity growth differential than in the United States, German inflation is 
not much higher than U.S. inflation and is virtually identical to U.S. inflation 
over the decade 1950-60.  Particularly in the first half of the Bretton Woods 
period, German authorities were able to restrain inflation through sterilization 
and a high interest rate policy; the country’s ongoing foreign reserve accumu- 
lation was the external counterpart to this  approach. The strategy became 
harder to implement after the return to convertibility, and, as noted above, the 
deutsche mark was revalued in  1961, 1969, and 1971. Japan, in contrast, did 
not change its official parity of  % 360 per dollar until 197  1, several years after 
a marked trend toward external surplus had emerged. 
Differing national .productivity trends may also affect the ease with which 
countries adjust to shocks. For example, a large productivity-growth differ- 
ential in favor of tradables eases the adjustment to expenditure-reducing poli- 
36. Given inflation, an important determinant of  national saving is the nominal interest rate 
determined by monetary policy. If capital mobility is perfect and the exchange-rate peg credible, 
capital inflows will automatically  keep the nominal interest rate at the world level. But if there is 
scope for sterilization, the authorities may be able to slow domestic inflation for a while by push- 
ing up the nominal interest rate and, with it, saving. 226  Maurice Obstfeld 
Table 4.1  Inflation Rates and Productivity Growth 
Annual Average Compound Rate 
United States  Germany  Japan 
Inflation: 
1950-60  2.6  2.8  5.3 
1960-7 1  3.4  4.1  5.5 
Labor productivity growth by  sector, 1950-73: 
Services  1.4  2.8  4.0 
Agriculture  5.4  6.3  1.3 
Industrya  2.2  5.6  9.5 
Capital productivity growth, 1950-73: 
.34  .57  1.39 
Note:  Inflation rates are based  on GNP deflators.  For a  full description  of  data  sources,  see 
App. B. 
’Including construction 
cies requiring a fall in the relative price of nontradables. Since the equilibrium 
level of that price is rising rapidly, a decline in its rate of increase, rather than 
a more painful absolute decrease, may be sufficient for adjustment. Similarly, 
a country with low overall labor-productivity growth will face a general dis- 
advantage in undertaking adjustments requiring lower real wages. This is one 
reason why Japan appears to have adjusted more readily to adverse shocks 
than did the United States or most other countries (see Yeager 1976, 521-35). 
Figure 4.2, which shows real and nominal exchange-rate indexes for the 
United States, Germany, and Japan over the years 1950-74,  places the conclu- 
sions from table 4.1 in the context of a broader sample of countries. Each real 
exchange rate (symbolized by a solid line) is the country’s price level in U. S. 
dollars, divided by an equally weighted geometric average of the dollar price 
levels of itself and eleven other Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.37  The data come from the Penn World Table 
(Mark V), as described by Summers and Heston (1991). An advantage of the 
Summers-Heston data is that the real exchange-rate indices can be interpreted 
in absolute terms, that is, as relative prices of similar national output baskets. 
The nominal exchange-rate indexes (symbolized by broken lines) are defined 
analogously to the real indexes, but they are arbitrarily normalized and thus 
carry no absolute interpretation. An increase in either exchange-rate index is 
a currency appreciation (real or nominal) for the country to which the figure 
applies; a decrease is a currency depreciation. 
Figure 4.2~  shows a trend decline in the dollar’s real exchange rate over the 
Bretton Woods period, an inevitable result of the processes of reconstruction 
37. The twelve countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 227  The Adjustment Mechanism 
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and development in the postwar world. After the large-scale currency realign- 
ments  of September  1949, the U.S. price  level was  more than 40 percent 
higher than the average price level in the twelve countries entering the index. 
This discrepancy, only a fraction of  which had disappeared by  1960, helps 
account for Europe’s ability to reduce substantially its current-account deficit 
with the United States over the next decade. Even in 1970 the dollar was still 
overvalued by about 20 percent, according to a crude purchasing-power-parity 
criterion. Only with the start of generalized floating in February 1973 did the 
dollar’s real exchange rate, for the first time, fall below the group 
The deutsche mark’s real  exchange rate,  which is shown in figure 4.2b, 
actually falls between  1950 and  1957 before reversing course. It reaches  a 
local peak in  1963 and then falls again through  1968. This pattern reflects 
both the Bundesbank’s efforts to resist inflation and the cyclical experience of 
the German economy. Only after 1969 does the deutsche mark appreciate de- 
cisively in real terms in line with the underlying pattern of German productiv- 
ity growth. 
Japan’s experience,  summarized in figure 4.2c, shows clearly the strong 
upward trend in the real exchange rate of the yen. Despite relatively high rates 
of  overall inflation, Japan’s exports remained competitive. For example, Ja- 
pan’s export prices were roughly stable over the decade 1959-69  (see Solo- 
mon  1982,  111). Ongoing trade competition from Japan was an additional 
factor behind the dollar’s secular real depreciation. 
Figure 4.2a, on the dollar, offers clues about the objective basis for the 
exchange-rate expectations that helped bring down the Bretton Woods system 
between  1971 and  1973. The figure shows a real appreciation of  the dollar 
starting in  1967 and fueled by the combination of excessive U.S. fiscal and 
monetary expansion from 1965 to 1968, a cyclical downturn in Europe, and 
the sterling devaluation. In 1970, with gloomy trade-balance prospects and an 
exchange rate overvalued relative to its apparent trend, the United States en- 
tered a recession. Burdened with an overall productivity growth rate below 
that of its main trading partners, the United States was badly positioned to 
adjust without a sharp slowdown in wage and price inflation; yet, by  1970, 
inflation expectations were becoming entrenched. The dollar’s link to market 
gold prices had already been severed. Market participants understood that a 
dollar devaluation relative to currencies was the next logical step. 
4.5  Currency Realignment in Practice 
After the round of sharp currency devaluations in 1949, the major industrial 
countries became exceedingly  reluctant to realign. The founders of  Bretton 
Woods had provided realignment as a major tool of adjustment-indeed,  as 
the only feasible tool in cases of “fundamental disequilibrium.” Any evalua- 
tion of  the Bretton Woods adjustment mechanism must understand why exist- 
38. In 1988, the most recent year for which data are available, the level was 80.7 229  The Adjustment Mechanism 
ing parities were defended so tenaciously, usually at great expense to the pub- 
lic purse.  39 
The major realignments between 1949 and the Smithsonian were the two 
French franc devaluations-one  “disguised,” one overt-in  August 1957 and 
December 1958; the franc devaluation of  August  1969; the sterling devaluation 
of  November  1967; and  the  deutsche mark  revaluations  of  March  1961 and 
October 1969. These realignments were  matched  by  some trading partners; in 
the U.K. case, roughly twenty  countries in all  (including British dependencies 
but not including any of the major industrial countries) followed sterling down. 
4.5.1 
Britain is the country that resisted realignment longest and at greatest cost 
in terms of both budgetary expense and forgone economic growth. The British 
case therefore gives a very clear picture of the forces pushing policymakers to 
avoid devaluation despite apparently strong justifying circumstances. Brit- 
ain’s 1949 devaluation had been traumatic, in part because it represented par- 
tial expropriation of the large stock of sterling balances built up during World 
War I1 and after. Harrod (1952, 29) characterized the devaluation, not only as 
unnecessary, but as “a disaster of the first magnitude.” Britain’s reputation was 
injured, and the series of competitive depreciations that rapidly followed lim- 
ited the benefits for British trade.@  The succeeding Conservative governments 
of  Churchill,  Eden,  Macmillan,  and  Douglas-Home sought to  avoid  the 
charges of  economic mismanagement that would inevitably follow a second 
devaluation. Indeed, the fear that devaluation will  signal incompetence ap- 
pears more generally to be a powerful deterrent. 
When Harold Wilson’s Labour government took power in October 1964, it 
faced a gathering exchange crisis and  a Treasury memorandum suggesting 
three possible responses, one of them a devaluation of  sterling. At so early a 
date, the political opprobrium could easily have been shifted onto the depart- 
ing Conservative government. Wilson’s (1  97 1,  6) explanation of  his opposi- 
tion to devaluation at that time is revealing: 
Politically, it might have been tempting and we  were not unaware of  the 
temptation. But I was convinced, and my colleagues agreed, that to devalue 
could have the most dangerous consequences. 
The financial world at home and abroad was aware that the postwar de- 
Devaluation as a Last Resort: The British Case 
39. For more general discussion and empirical analysis of devaluation in particular, see Cooper 
(1971) and Edwards (1989). The authors focus on developing countries, but many of their findings 
are relevant to the present discussion. 
40.  Harrod’s (1952) gloomy assessment of the 1949 devaluation was largely based on its terms- 
of-trade effects; in addition,  he was an elasticity pessimist as far as Britain was concerned.  In 
Harrod’s view, the British government should have blocked and rescheduled the sterling balances 
after the war; this move, he believed, would have allowed the country to achieve convertibility in 
1947, to avoid the  crisis of  1949,  and, more generally, to restore international confidence in 
the value of sterling. He was not a believer in modem “trigger-strategy” reputation mechanisms; 
as he put it, “Memories are short, and business is conducted mainly by reference to present advan- 
tage” (p. 13). 230  Maurice Obstfeld 
cision to devalue in 1949 had been taken by a Labour Government. There 
would  have  been  many  who would  conclude that a Labour Government 
facing difficulties always took the easy way out by devaluing the pound. 
Speculation would be aroused every time that Britain ran into even minor 
economic difficulties-or  even without them. For we were to learn over the 
years that it was all too easy for those so minded to talk the pound down on 
the most frivolous of pretexts.  . . . 
But there were other considerations.  We  might well have started off  an 
orgy of competitive beggar-my-neighbor currency devaluations-similar  to 
those of the  1930s-which  would have plunged the world into monetary 
chaos, and left us no better off-even,  perhaps,  stimulating economic na- 
tionalism and blind protectionism abroad. 
There were also strong reasons in terms of the domestic, economic and 
political scene. I had always argued-and  continued to argue for the next 
three years-that  devaluation was not an easy way out; that, by  its very 
nature in cheapening exports and making imports dearer, it would require a 
severe and rapid transfer of resources from home consumption, public and 
private,  to meet the needs of  overseas markets.  This would  mean brutal 
restraints in both public and private expenditure over and above what was 
required by the domestic situation we had inherited. 
In this account, one can discern four distinct reasons for avoiding devalua- 






Reputation.  Only by  establishing  a reputation  for defending the official 
parity to the end could a country avoid the destabilizing capital flows that 
would otherwise blow the economy off course. 
Retaliation.  Trading  partners  might respond  with  punitive trade bamers 
or with devaluations of their own, thus stripping the devaluer of part of its 
competitiveness gains. 
The terms  of trade. The accompanying  fall in the terms of  trade  would 
itself be costly. 
Expenditure reduction. To offset possible inflationary  effects of devalua- 
tion  and  rapidly  liberate  resources  for export, a  severe compression of 
domestic absorption would be needed. This in itself was a political  cost. 
But  a delayed  improvement  in trade figures would not only strain inter- 
national reserves  but also create a period  of heightened vulnerability  to 
the political opposition. 
In the British case there were other considerations.  One was a reluctance to 
depreciate official sterling balances. Another was the view that Britain’s trade 
was being damaged by industrial problems and low labor productivity, prob- 
lems that a devaluation would not cure.41 
41. On the latter problems, see Wilson (1971, 258). In November 1967, the chancellor of the 
Exchequer, James Callaghan, resigned over the government’s failure to maintain the value of the 
sterling balances. (Callaghan had supported devaluation and felt honor bound to make a gesture 231  The Adjustment Mechanism 
4.5.2  Realignment, the Current Account, and Relative Prices 
Another possible reason for resisting devaluation might be a belief that its 
trade-balance effects are  small.  Several authors (e.g.,  Laffer  1977; Salant 
1977; and Miles 1979) argue that devaluations of the 1950s and 1960s gener- 
ally were  ineffective in promoting trade-balance or current-account adjust- 
ment. For example, devaluation may feed rapidly into domestic prices, neu- 
tralizing competitiveness gains that might otherwise encourage net  exports. 
Salant and Miles offer evidence, however, that devaluation leads to subsequent 
balance-of-payments surpluses. These surpluses could be due to the liquidity 
shortage caused by  a rise in prices, or to a reversal of prior capital flight, but 
not to an improved trade balance. If this interpretation is correct, devaluations 
do not  effectively shift demand toward domestic products, and, while de- 
valuations may  attract reserves in the short run,  they would  have  been of 
little  help  in  combating  domestic  unemployment in  deficit-cum-deflation 
dilemmas. 
A definitive assessment of the effects of a devaluation would have to ana- 
lyze not only the accompanying macroeconomic policy measures but also any 
additional endogenous and exogenous influences. No studies this conclusive 
exist, but the available evidence suggests that the major Bretton Woods deval- 
uations did lead to trade-balance improvements. Britain’s current-account bal- 
ance indeed worsened sharply in the first half of  1968 but entered onto a sus- 
tained improvement in the year’s second half  as the government’s incomes 
policy (removed in 1969) was backed up by tight monetary and fiscal policies. 
In a detailed partial equilibrium study, Artus (1  975) argues that the devalua- 
tion was instrumental in attaining this improvement. France’s 1957-58  deval- 
uations were followed by  a long-lasting improvement in its current-account 
balance (Dieterlen and Durand 1973, 136). In both countries, however, deval- 
uation preceded a period of relatively high inflation4*  The August 1969 franc 
devaluation, coupled with the October 1969 deutsche mark revaluation, also 
was  followed by  an  improved French trade balance (Dieterlen and Durand 
1973, 158; Yeager 1976,483). 
One way  to judge the plausibility of  the hypothesis that Bretton Woods 
realignments had lasting relative-price effects is simply to examine time series 
of  penance.  He nonetheless  become home secretary  and served as prime minister in the late 
1970s.) To  persuade foreign countries to continue holding sterling reserves, Britain subsequently 
negotiated a conditional guarantee against future depreciation of the pound. As the main reserve 
currency issuer, the United States naturally faced a problem similar to Britain’s, but on a larger 
scale, in deciding whether to devalue the dollar. 
42. If devaluation is from a position of unemployment, there is no need in theory for an inflation 
of domestic prices to follow, even if contractionary policies are not adopted (see app. A). The rise 
in import prices will cause a one-time price-level jump, however. Dieterlen and Durand (1973, 
142) assert that “it was the increase in the volume of  domestic credit that was responsible for 
[post-1958 French] inflation.” British inflation after  1967 was due to several factors, including 
real-wage resistance, an  eventual policy reversal, and increasing inflation abroad. 232  Maurice Obstfeld 
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of  real exchange rates over the relevant period. These data cannot disclose 
why particular nominal realignments had the relative-price effects they did. 
Nor can they reveal the effects of the relative-price changes on trade balances. 
But a systematic pattern of relative-price effects would suggest a fundamental 
regularity deserving further study. 
Figure 4.3 plots annual data on real and nominal exchange rates for France 
and the United Kingdom over the period  1950-74.  As was the case in figure 
4.2 above, the real exchange rates (solid lines) are based on the Summers- 
Heston (1991) data and can be  interpreted as relative prices. The nominal 
indexes (broken lines) have no absolute interpretation and serve mainly to 
indicate the timing and proportional magnitude of nominal parity changes. As 
before, an upward movement is a (real or nominal) currency appreciation. 
Real exchange rates as defined in the figures are only imperfectly correlated 
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Real and nominal exchange-rate indexes, annual data, 1950-74.  a,  Fig. 4.3 
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with competitiveness. Nonetheless, a devaluation-induced real depreciation, 
for example, will be due in part to a fall in the price of domestic relative to 
foreign tradables. Furthermore, any resulting change in the relative price of 
tradables and nontradables will shift resources in a manner that supports trade- 
balance adjustment. Figure 4.3 (and fig. 4.2b above for Germany) suggests 
that all the realignments had fairly persistent relative-price effects. 
Between 1956 and 1959, the French real index in figure 4.3~  moved from 
131.8 to 110.2 as a result of the unofficial 16.7 percent devaluation of August 
1957 and the 14.9 percent devaluation of December 1958. (Percentages mea- 
sure reduction in dollar price.) It stayed in a close neighborhood of the latter 
number until 1969, when a further 10 percent devaluation occurred in August. 
From 1968 to 1970, the real index dropped from 11  1.3 to 100.9. 
Similarly, figure 4.36 shows a drop in the United Kingdom’s real exchange 
rate index from 103.5 in  1966 to 88.8 in  1968 (14.2 percent), which closely 
matches sterling’s 14.3 percent nominal devaluation in November 1967. The 
index remained close to that level until the 1973 float, at which point sterling 
depreciated further. 
The deutsche mark’s 5 percent revaluation against the dollar in March 1961 
is  reflected in  a 4.4 percent rise in  Germany’s real exchange rate between 
1960 and  1961 (fig. 4.26). In  1967, the real exchange rate was still near its 
1961 value. Between 1969 and 1970, the real index rose by 7.5 percent as the 
deutsche mark was revalued by 9.3 percent in October 1969, and further in- 
creases followed as the currency was floated in May 1971 and realigned again 
in December. 
4.5.3  Other Considerations 
A general consideration in deciding whether to resist realignment was the 
chance that a disequilibrium might not be “fundamental” at all but instead a 
transitory payments gap that could be financed with no parity change. Thus, a 
multilateral credit facility arranged in March 1964 allowed Italy to avoid de- 
valuing the lira.43  Wilson (1971) argues that only by  1967 was there broad 
acceptance within foreign official circles that Britain’s imbalance was funda- 
mental. A package of international credits possibly large enough to have post- 
poned devaluation was discussed, but it would have carried a level of  condi- 
tionality unacceptable to the Labour government. 
Surplus countries were reluctant to realign for some of the same reasons as 
deficit countries, and for different ones. As in the case of  deficit countries, 
reputation posed a problem. In the late 1960s, the German authorities learned 
painfully that hot money inflows sparked by  speculative expectations might 
leave no choice but an upward adjustment of the deutsche mark. Revaluation 
43. See Ferrari (1973) and Yeager (1976,538). For an analytic account of the crisis, see Modi- 
gliani and La Malfa (1967). 234  Maurice Obstfeld 
would remove external inflation pressures even if some other trading partners 
emulated the move, but the resulting decline in the competitiveness of exports 
was an important political deterrent. 
The United States faced a special problem-similar  to Britain’s, but on a 
larger scale-because  of the dollar’s reserve-currency status. Both American 
prestige and future confidence in the dollar would, it was believed, be under- 
mined by a devaluation relative to nondollar currencies. While such a deval- 
uation was not unthinkable under Bretton Woods rules, the sheer complexity 
of  the multilateral negotiations such a step would entail loomed as a signifi- 
cant obstacle. 
Given the long list of drawbacks, reputational and otherwise, it is not sur- 
prising that governments avoided realignment, despite the benefits it could 
bring if accompanied by complementary macroeconomic policies. Most gov- 
ernments lacked the political will or foresight to adopt policies that would 
have obviated eventual realignments. In this setting, the increasingly efficient 
world financial market was at best an unreliable adjunct to adjustment and at 
worst a threat to exchange-rate stability. 
4.6  Some Evidence on International Capital Mobility 
Earlier sections of this chapter have argued that imperfect capital mobility 
during the Bretton Woods era confronted deficit countries with liquidity con- 
straints while giving surplus countries the ability to sterilize reserve inflows 
over considerable periods. It was suggested that exchange and political risks 
destabilized private  capital  flows  and  that  destabilizing flows undermined 
credibility further, in a circular process. 
Because the behavior of capital flows is so central to the adjustment prob- 
lems of  the Bretton Woods system, I turn in this section to evidence from 
financial markets. The discussion is selective and concentrates on Germany 
and the United Kingdom. 
The Bretton Woods period as a whole shows a more limited variability of 
current-account imbalances than did the gold standard era. In the first postwar 
years, when the need for reconstruction investment was most desperate, re- 
source transfers into Europe were based largely on aid from North America 
and were not overly large by pre-World  War I standards. The current-account 
deficit of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was 
4.8 percent of its output in 1947 (mostly financed by $5.3 billion in U.S. and 
Canadian aid) and 2.7 percent in 1948 but only 0.8 percent in 1949, 0.2 per- 
cent in 1950, and 0.7 percent in 1951 (see Triffin 1957, tables 8 and 11 in the 
statistical appendix). The deficit dropped so sharply after 1948, despite the 
continuance of  substantial Marshall Plan support, in part because European 
countries were accumulating reserves and in part because of  higher private 
capital outflows from Europe. Only in the 1980s did the current-account ratios 235  The Adjustment Mechanism 
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of major industrial countries again reach levels even comparable to those seen 
in the late nineteenth century. 
Use of ex post current-account flows for inferences about capital mobility 
is perilous. I therefore turn to a more direct indicator of capital mobility, the 
relation between rates of  return on comparable assets issued within different 
national jurisdictions. 
Monthly data on German and U.K. Treasury bill interest rates, going back 
to 1950 and 1947, respectively, are plotted in figures 4.4 and 4.5. The German 
securities have a sixty- to ninety-day maturity, the U.K. bills a ninety-one-day 
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Fig. 4.4  German short-term interest rates compared with U.S. short-term 
interest rates, monthly data, 1950-73  (percentage per year) 
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Fig. 4.5  U.K.  short-term interest rates compared with U.S. short-term interest 
rates, monthly data, 1947-73  (percentage per year) 236  Maurice Obstfeld 
maturity, so these assets may plausibly be  compared with ninety-day U.S. 
Treasury bills.  There are two obstacles to interpreting such a comparison, 
however. First, the German rates obviously are imperfectly flexible. This is 
not a serious problem on the assumption that bills were indeed being sold at 
these “selling” rates.  Second, and more important, the fixed-exchange-rate 
provision of the IMF Articles did not literally fix exchange rates; it permitted 
fluctuations of  k 1 percent from parity. Thus, dollar exchange rates were free 
to move by as much as 2  percent. 
To appreciate the importance of this second factor, observe that a 2 percent 
exchange-rate change over three months is equivalent to a change of  8.24 
percent at a compounded annual rate. Thus, even if exchange-rate margins 
were expected to hold with certainty, annualized three-month interest rates 
between dollars and other currencies could in principle diverge by as much as 
8.24 percent per year. The divergences in figures 4.4 and 4.5 are generally 
much smaller, but this finding provides little information about capital mobil- 
ity. Domestic monetary authorities simply had considerable flexibility at the 
short end of the term structure. 
An  inspection of  medium- and long-term government bond rates is more 
informative. Figure 4.6 graphs the interest rates on both two-year German 
government bonds and three-year U.S. government bonds; figure 4.7 presents 
a similar comparison of  long-term U.K.  and U.S.  government bond rates. 
Even moving to a two-year horizon greatly reduces the problem of the parity 
margins since the maximum interest-rate deviation-under  the hypotheses of 
credible exchange-rate bands and perfect capital mobility-now  is only about 
1 percent per annum. Both figures show deviations that at times are consider- 
ably in excess of those allowed by these hypotheses. 
9, 
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Fig. 4.6  German medium-term interest rates compared with U.S. medium- 
term interest rates, monthly data, 1953-73  (percentage per year) 237  The Adjustment Mechanism 
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Fig. 4.7  U.K. long-term interest rates compared with U.S. long-term interest 
rates, monthly data, 1947-73  (percentage per year) 
In the case of  Germany, the bond rates appear to move in  step over the 
longer run. But some of  the larger and  more persistent differentials can be 
explained by  the policy goals of the German government. For example, the 
large excess of German over U.S. interest rates at the start of the sample is in 
part a legacy of  the speculative attack of  1951, but it persists long after the 
crisis has passed. (Figure 4.4,  with its longer data series, makes this clearer 
than fig. 4.6.) The large increase in the German-U.S. spread in  1955-56  re- 
flects the Bank  Deutscher Liinder’s  response to gathering inflationary im- 
pulses. Finally, the drop in German interest rates below U.S. rates in  1967 
corresponds to a period of sharp domestic economic slowdown. 
The U.K.  long-term bond yields in  figure 4.7  consistently exceed U.S. 
yields, sometimes by  more than two hundred basis points. These numbers 
would be close to equality if the exchange-rate  commitment were credible and 
capital mobile. The strikingly large differential reflects some combination of 
expected devaluation and capital market separation-but  the components can- 
not be separately identified without further information.” 
One way of throwing light on the question is to combine data on short-term 
interest rates with data on forward exchange premia. The covered interest par- 
ity theorem predicts that, if  iys is the three-month U.S. Treasury bill interest 
rate (measured at a quarterly rate), i:  the corresponding foreign rate, F, the 
three-month forward dollar price of foreign currency, and E, the corresponding 
spot price, then in a perfect capital market 
44.  Contemporary observers attributed much of the differential to the risks posed by Britain’s 
large stock of short-term sterling liabilities to official and private holders (the so-called sterling 
balances). See, e.g.,  Cooper (1968,  187),  who (p.  184) places the average magnitude of  the 
balances at f3,500 million over 1945-66.  This figure is just over 10 percent of Britain’s 1966 
nominal GDP. 238  Maurice Obstfeld 
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Condition (7) reflects arbitrage that would be feasible and riskless in the ab- 
sence of  transaction costs,  existing impediments to capital movement, and 
political risk-defined  by  Aliber (1973,  1453) as “the probability that the 
authority of the state will be interposed between investors in one country and 
investment opportunities in other countries.” On the assumption that transac- 
tion costs are not too large, the (annualized) covered interest differential d,, 
defined as 
1  + iys = (F,/EJ(l  + i;,. 
d, = 100  x  {(I + iy))“ - [(F,/E,)(I  + i:)14}, 
can be taken as a measure of financial market segmentation due to actual in- 
ternational investment barriers or political risks.45 
Figure 4.8 plots the differential (8) for Germany, and figure 4.9 plots it for 
the United Kingdom; both figures show monthly data running from January 
1960 to December 1973. Notice that the start of  the sample postdates the res- 
toration of external convertibility by about a year. The dates used in construct- 
ing the figures are all end-of-month rates, a choice that hopefully minimizes 
problems of  data misalignment  .46  Large discrepancies remain, however, in 
both  cases.  Since these cannot now  be  ascribed to expected exchange-rate 
changes, the results confirm the existence of  obstacles to the international 
movement of  funds. 
45. For other applications to the Bretton Woods period, see Aliber (1978) and Dooley and Isard 
(1980). An  alternative measure  (and a superior one for some purposes) would be based on a 
comparison of interest rates on similar assets denominated in the same currency but  issued in 
different countries. Unfortunately, appropriate data do not extend as far back as the early 1960s. 
46. A more thorough analysis would also attempt to correct for transaction costs. 
As noted in Appendix B, the relevant interest and exchange rates are taken from the OECD data 
base distributed with RATS. There is a puzzle in the data, however. The RATS data, as well as 
the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics, 1964-1983, report the end-October 
1967 ninety-day forward rate  as 241.30 U.S. cents per pound.  (On  18 November, the British 
government changed the parity from $2.80 to $2.40 per pound.) In an earlier publication, Main 
Economic Indicators:  Historical Statistics,  1960-1979,  however, the OECD reports the end- 
October 1967 ninety-day forward rate as 277.62 cents per pound. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the 
latter number, not the updated one, that is more nearly correct. According to Yeager (1976,460). 
“Before devaluation, the pound had not gone to a large forward discount. Aware of how important 
the forward rate was as an indicator of expectations and as an incentive to outward arbitrage, the 
Bank of England had been intervening since 1964. The discount on three-months-forward sterling 
remained smaller than I percent per annum from early 1967 until the end of October and reached 
only 1.73 percent on the eve of devaluation. . . .  Devaluation, when it came, left the authorities 
with massive commitments to buy pounds at a rate well above the new spot price.” 
Prime Minister Wilson’s recollections (Wilson 1971, 460) confirm the absence of a crisis at- 
mosphere in October: “The financial pages of the press had not been expressed in crisis terms until 
the very last week. The Economist, usually quick to catch the changing mood of markets, had not 
devoted any leading article to describe anything in the nature of a gathering crisis-as  opposed to 
unease-until  its issue of  1  lth November. Even this was in the business section at the hack and 
was in  part expressed  in terms of  prospects  for the next six  months.” One presumes that the 
Economist would have remarked on a double-digit forward discount on sterling had one existed! 
In the regression analysis, the October 1967 forward rate reported in the RATS OECD data base 
is therefore changed to 277.62 cents per pound, the value originally reported by the OECD. 239  The Adjustment Mechanism 
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Fig. 4.8  Excess covered dollar return on U.S. compared with German short- 
term government bonds, monthly data, 1960-73 
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Fig. 4.9  Excess covered dollar return on U.S. compared with U.K. short-term 
government bonds, monthly data, 1960-73 
It is useful to go beyond this observation and see if the data reveal anything 
more. Are the deviations in figures 4.8 and 4.9 different from zero on average? 
Are they short-lived shocks, or do they show persistence? Is there any change 
over time in  the stochastic properties of  the deviations? Answers to these 
questions might give clues about the factors impeding international arbitage. 
To  answer the foregoing questions,  I postulate a simple statistical data- 
generating process for the deviations d,: 240  Maurice Obstfeld 
(9) 
m 
d, = K + yt +  +,LrPi. 
,=O 
Equation (9) has the following interpretation. The deterministic term K  + yr 
is the unconditional mean deviation from covered interest parity; this devia- 
tion has a trend change of y basis points per month. I will refer to -  (K  + yr) 
as the “country premium” relative to the United States. The infinite stochastic 
sum in (9) represents  a random  and possibly persistent  deviation from the 
unconditional mean deviation. Each term 5, in this sum is unpredictable given 
its own past history. To economize on free parameters, I make the simplifying 
assumption that +i  = pi, for all i, where 0 < p < 1. Then (9) can be written 
in the easily estimated form 
(10)  d, = K(1 -  P) f YP + y(1 -  P)t + Pd,-,  + 5,. 
The parameter p can be interpreted as a measure of the geometric rate at 
which capital  flows eliminate covered interest differentials. A rationale for 
this process is that arbitrageurs are credit constrained and unable to borrow 
enough to eliminate even a sure profit opportunity in the short run.  If  the 
opportunity persists, however, other assets can eventually be liquidated to ob- 
tain more funds for investment in the high-return market. The country pre- 
mium is the portion of the arbitrage opportunity that is not ultimately elimi- 
nated; the gradual arbitrage process is a symptom of capital market rigidities. 
Table 4.2,  panel A, presents estimates of the parameters in (9), obtained by 
nonlinear least squares estimation of (10). Data are monthly and extend from 
February 1960 to August 1971. The estimates suggest that, for both countries, 
there is a small and statistically insignificant country premium. The determin- 
istic trend in this premium is also insignificant, but deviations from interest 
parity are significantly persistent. Adjustment is, however, fairly rapid.  Ac- 
cording to the German results, for example, all but 0.77912 = 5 percent of a 
random  deviation  from  the  deterministic  country  premium  is eliminated 
within a year. 
There is evidence of  considerable within-sample  structural  instability, as 
panels B and C indicate. Panel B estimates over the (relatively tranquil) period 
February 1960-December 1965. Both countries start out with highly signifi- 
cant country premia,  but  the  premia  trend  downward rather quickly. Ger- 
many’s initial premium, which is just over two hundred basis points, trends 
downward at a rate of  4.3 basis points per month. The United Kingdom’s 
initial premium, which is just over sixty-three basis points, trends downward 
at a slower rate of 1.1 basis points per month. Random deviations are persis- 
tent, but again are eliminated quite quickly, particularly in the U.K. estimates, 
which imply that just under 95 percent of a random deviation is arbitraged 
away after seven months. 
The  early  data,  in  summary,  indicate  initial  mean  country  premia  that 
trended away over time, possibly as a result of growing financial market effi- 241  The Adjustment Mechanism 
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Table 4.2  Estimates ofd, = K + yt +  pi&-i 
i=O 
Country  K  Y  P  S.E.E.  h 
A. February 1960-August  1971: 
Germany  -  .315 
United Kingdom  -  ,486 
(.469) 
(.965) 
B. February 196GDecember 1965: 
(4.366) 
(3.097) 
Germany  -2.051 
United Kingdom  -  ,633 
C. December 1965-August  1971: 
Germany  2.937 
(1.520) 
United Kingdom  1.397 
(509) 
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Note:  Point estimates are calculated by  nonlinear least squares; absolute t-statistics are below 
them in parentheses. Durbin’s h-test for first-order serial correlation is reported above; the test 
statistic’s marginal significance level appears in parentheses. For data description, see App. B. 
ciency.  In  addition,  random  deviations  from  these  premia  are  persistent 
enough to suggest that the authorities may have had some room for maneuver 
in monetary policy over a horizon of two or three quarters. 
The estimates in panel C are harder to interpret, in part because the period 
is more turbulent. Germany starts with a negative country premium compared 
with  the  United  States, but  by  the end of  the period,  as  German capital- 
account restrictions escalate, the premium has shifted partially in the reverse 
direction. The estimates are less precise than those in panel B, and the large 
value of  Durbin’s h-statistic is evidence that the adjustment process may be 
mi~specified.~~  No significant premium relative to the United States is dis- 
closed by the U.K. estimates; this is not surprising in view of the somewhat 
similar balance-of-payments problems that the United States and the United 
Kingdom were experiencing. Once again, random deviations from covered 
interest parity show some month-to-month persistence. 
The results on the whole support the interpretation of  the Bretton Woods 
period as one in which capital mobility was still imperfect, but increasing. 
Country premia, negative and positive, certainly existed; together with addi- 
47. Box-Ljung Q-statistics were also calculated as a portmanteau test against serial correlation 
of unknown form. Only for the United Kingdom, over the complete sample, did the Q-test provide 
evidence of  serial correlation at the 10 percent level or below.  (The result was Q[33] = 57.08, 
with a significance level of 0.006.) 242  Maurice Obstfeld 
tional financial market shocks, they contributed at times to large deviations 
from covered  interest parity.  Unusually  high  excess returns provoked  arbi- 
trage, but its operation, while relatively swift in the German and U.K. cases, 
was far from instantaneous.  It is plausible that two distinct factors-jurisdic- 
tional risk and slow asset-market adjustment-combined  to separate national 
financial markets. 
4.7  Changes in the Cyclical Responsiveness of Prices 
A large body of  empirical  work concludes that nominal U.S.  wages and 
prices do not fit the paradigm of instantaneously clearing labor and product 
There is less agreement on wage and price  stickiness outside the 
United  States as well  as on changes over time in the degree of wage-price 
flexibility. These unresolved issues are central, however, to understanding the 
Bretton Woods system’s performance  in comparison with other international 
monetary regimes. 
In an influential study, Cagan (1975) concludes that nominal U.S.  whole- 
sale prices were  significantly  more flexible before  World War  I1 than after. 
Sachs (1980) reaffirms Cagan’s  findings for wholesale prices and reaches a 
similar conclusion concerning nominal U.S. wages. Several reasons for this 
apparent change in price flexibility have been put forward, among them the 
U.S. government’s formal responsibility to pursue full employment, growing 
industrial concentration,  and changes in the nature of  wage bargaining and 
contracts. 
Schultze (1981) finds, however, that the U.S. nonfood consumer price in- 
dex and private nonfarm GNP deflator did not become significantly less flex- 
ible in the postwar era. He argues further that the studies by Cagan and Sachs 
exaggerate  the prewar-to-postwar  changes in the cyclical responsiveness of 
wholesale prices and wages.49 In the same vein, Allen (1992) finds that biases 
due to data construction can explain the apparent rise in U.S. wage inflexibil- 
ity found by Sachs. Gordon (1983, 90), applying a Phillips curve methodol- 
ogy to wage and GNP-deflator data reaching back to the nineteenth century, 
concludes that “wages and prices are less sticky and inertia-bound in postwar 
U.K. and Japanese data than in the postwar United States, and the inertia in 
U.S. wage and price behavior is purely a postwar phenomenon,’’ 
It is well established (e.g., Taylor 1987; Alogoskoufis and Smith 1991) that 
nominal U.K. and U.S. wages and prices have become more persistent in the 
postwar period. Persistence alone is not evidence of stickiness, however: per- 
fectly flexible prices will display persistence if the exogenous “fundamentals” 
they depend on are themselves persistent. Any econometric methodology for 
measuring price stickiness must somehow disentangle the intrinsic inertia in 
48.  For a discussion of evidence, see Hall and Taylor (1991). 
49. The methodologies of  Cagan, Sachs, and Schultze all rely in part on a precise dating of 
prewar business cycles. This dating has been questioned by Romer (1991). 243  The Adjustment Mechanism 
prices from the inertia imparted by the fundamental determinants of  prices: 
relatively little can be learned from the univariate time-series properties of 
prices alone.50  The remainder of this section therefore pursues a multivariate 
methodology for quantifying a central aspect of  aggregate price rigidity. In 
essence, the approach is designed to measure the momentum or inertia in the 
price level that cannot be explained by persistent exogenous fundamentals. 
A wide class of  macroeconomic models leads to the following simple ac- 
count of  how a sluggish (log) price level, p,, adjusts through time. Let p; 
denote a  “forward-looking” shadow equilibrium price that  depends exclu- 
sively on the current and discounted expected future values of  some exoge- 
nous fundamentals, but not on the current price level. Then if  E,.,{.} denotes 
an expected value conditional on time t - 1 information, price adjustment is 
described by 
Above, P E [0, I] measures the year-to-year persistence of  price disequili- 
bria; the case p = 0 corresponds to perfect price flexibility. If o,  is the rational 
error made in predicting p, at time t -  1,  equation (1  1) can be written as 
(12) 
In equation (1 2), b is an unknown coefficient column vector, and z,  is a column 
vector of  variables that are themselves fundamentals, and thus influence p; 
directly, or that aid in forecasting future fundamentals. 
Equation (12) can be estimated by ordinary least squares once the variables 
in z,  are specified. This line of reasoning leads to essentially the same econo- 
metric specification used in  some other tests of  aggregate price stickiness, 
such as Rotemberg’s (1982) more tightly structural study of  postwar U.S. 
prices. 
The empirical approach taken above does not try to assess the response of 
prices to contemporaneous information. The nominal price level could be 
PI  = PR-1 + [E,-,{pl - Pp-I1 + w, 
= pp,-, + b’z,-, + 0,. 
50.  To  take  a  simple  example,  let  the  log  price  level  follow  the  stochastic  process 
p, =  + k,, where p is an adjustment coefficient that would be zero under perfect price 
flexibility, and k,  is an unobservable exogenous driving process. Suppose that the “fundamentals,” 
k,, follow the process k, = cpk,-,  + rll, where cp measures the persistence in fundamentals. Then 
the price level can be described by either of the observationally equivalent representations 
m 
(ii)  P,  = QPr-l + 2 h-,. 
On the basis of the time series of prices alone, one will never be able to distinguish the role of p 
from that of  cp:  equation (ii) looks like the price equation we would get if prices had persistence 
cp  and fundamentals persistence p. Alternatively, notice that either (i) or (ii) implies the AR(2) 
representation for the price level p, = (p + cp)p,_, - pcpp,-,  + q,.  Neither p nor cp  is individ- 
ually identifiable. 
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quite flexible, even with p near one, if only a small proportion of its variabil- 
ity were due to predictable factors. As will be shown below, this is certainly 
not true in the postwar era, nor is it generally true in the gold standard era.5’ 
Two assumptions must be valid if (12) is to yield reliable results. First, the 
vector z, can omit no relevant variables that are correlated withp,. Second, the 
lagged price level, p,- ,, must not aid significantly in forecasting future values 
of  the shadow equilibrium price, p, conditional on z,-, being known. These 
assumptions are strong-perhaps  unpalatable-and  clearly merit investiga- 
tion in future work. In particular, if the second assumption fails, the estimated 
value of  p will reflect not only price rigidity but also the incremental infor- 
mation about future fundamentals contained in prices. 
Table 4.3 reports the results of estimating p in equation (12) with annual 
data from two time periods, 1882-1913  and 1952-71.  The price index is the 
GNP deflator, and the results cover France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The variables composing z,  are the period t 
and r - 1 logarithms of the money supply and real GNP (which are not really 
exogenous fundamentals, as emphasized by Alogoskoufis and Smith [  19911, 
but are all there is to work with). Regressions contain a constant and a time 
trend. 
Taken together, the results suggest significant nominal price inflexibility 
over the earlier period and provide some evidence of  greater inflexibility in 
the later period. Apart from Japan and the United  States, all the countries 
show a p of  around 0.6 during the gold standard period. (Japan’s price level 
appears more flexible than that of the other countries, while U.S. prices ap- 
pear less flexible.) For most of the countries, p is estimated to increase in the 
Bretton Woods period. Surprisingly, however, this is not a universal phenom- 
enon. The French and Japanese coefficients drop, and become statistically in- 
significant, in the later sample. Both of  these GNP deflators therefore show 
behavior consistent with considerable price flexibility. For the other countries, 
p is estimated to be close to, or even above, one over 1952-71.  In the U.S. 
case, the estimated increase in p is small and disappears entirely if one length- 
ens the early sample. 
The fit of these equations, as measured by  the adjusted R2, appears to be 
closer in the second sample period, regardless of country. This could be inter- 
preted as indicating lower predictability, and hence greater flexibility, in gold 
standard prices. There are other equally plausible interpretations, however. 
The variances of the underlying unpredictable shocks may  simply have been 
greater in the gold standard period, as suggested by Taylor (1987). (Flexible 
prices will be predictable if the fundamentals are predictable as well.) Alter- 
natively, the quality and coverage of the price indexes may differ systemati- 
cally across the two periods. 
There is some evidence of  specification error in the equations. Over the 
5 1. Meese (1984) discusses tests of price stickiness based on contemporaneous correlations. Table 4.3  Price Rigidity: The Gold Standard versus Bretton Woods 





France  fi  =  .551 
(2.971) 
R2 =  .535 
Q(l5)  =  7.52 
(.94) 
F(4,25)  =  2.08 
(.]I) 
fi  =  ,552 
(3.559) 
R2  =  ,916 
Q(l5)  =  9.90 
(33) 
F(4,25)  =  3.96 
(.01) 
fi  =  ,611 
(3.658) 
d2 =  ,867 
Q(l5) = 10.29 
F(4.25)  =  1.55 
(.go) 
(  ,221 
fi  =  ,406 
R2  =  ,852 
(2.115) 
Q(13)  = 14.50 
(  .34) 
F(4,20)  =  .88 
C.49) 
(3.443) 
United Kingdom  fi  =  ,575 
R2  =  ,710 
Q(l5) = 17.54 
(.29) 
F(4,25)  =  2.36 
(.OW 
(9.836) 
R2 =  ,947 
Q(l5)  = 27.50 
(.02) 
F(4,25)  =  5.69 
(.W 
fi  =  ,888 
fi  =  .232 
(1.245) 
R2 =  ,994 
Q(l0) = 12.99 
(.22) 
F(4,13)  =  4.53 
(.02) 
fi  =  1.022 
(2.869) 
Rz  =  .984 
Q(l0)  =  7.03 




fi  =  ,933 
R2 =  ,983 
Q(l0) =  3.60 
(.  96) 
F(4,13)  =  3.13 
(.03 
fi  =  ,327 
(1.070) 
R2 =  ,995 
Q(9)  = 19.48 
F(4.11)  =  2.10 
(.W 
fi  =  1.363 
(4.189) 
R2  =  .993 
Q(10)  =  2.76 
(.99) 
F(4,13)  =  4.02 
fi  =  1.056 
(9.026) 
R2 =  ,997 
Q(l0) = 11.65 
C.31) 
F(4,13)  =  3.30 
(.W 
Nore: Based on estimates of the equation p, = a + Tt + pp,-, + b’z,-, + w,,  where p, is the 
log of the GNP  deflator, and z, contains two lags of  the log money supply and log real output. 
For data sources, see App. B. t-statistics appear in parentheses below the estimates of p.  Q is the 
Box-Ljung serial-correlation test statistic, and F is the test statistic for the hypothesis b  = 0; 
their significance levels appear in parentheses. 
‘Japanese data cover the periods 1887-1913  and 1954-71. 246  Maurice Obstfeld 
early sample period, the U.S. price equation shows strong evidence of resid- 
ual autocorrelation, as indicated by a high @statistic. Similarly, Japan’s price 
equation displays significant autocorrelation over the later period. The lagged 
fundamentals fail to be jointly significant in several of the equations, suggest- 
ing possible omitted-variables biases. Finally, the likely presence of a unit root 
in some of the price indexes (see Barsky [  19871 on the United States and the 
United Kingdom) would require an estimation strategy different from the one 
used here. Given the small samples available, it is not clear which strategy 
would yield more reliable inferences. 
The preceding results are in line with the somewhat ambiguous and contra- 
dictory findings of earlier empirical studies. Nominal prices in most industrial 
countries display symptoms of  stickiness even in the gold standard period. 
Nominal price inflexibility seems to have increased after World War 11,  but the 
evidence favoring this hypothesis is not overwhelming, and the extent of the 
increase may not be large. Characteristics of wages and prices other than flex- 
ibility per se may be more important for understanding the Bretton Woods 
period. Examples might include asymmetries in wage and price adjustability 
or real rigidities. These topics should be high on the agenda for future re- 
search. 
4.8  Conclusion 
Under the Bretton Woods system, two key economic frictions impeded ad- 
justment by deficit countries: limited wage-price flexibility and, for much of 
the period, limited recourse to international credit both by individuals and by 
most governments. Nominal wage and price rigidities ensured that nominal 
exchange-rate  stability  would  be  impracticable in  the  face  of  long-lived 
shocks. Imperfect capital mobility made countries’ reserve constraints tighter 
than they would have been in today’s world while still providing ample scope 
for destabilizing speculation. Surplus countries, naturally under less pressure 
to adjust, were able to exploit imperfect capital mobility to sterilize reserve 
inflows over long periods and to slow the upward adjustment of  their price 
levels. 
International credit markets evolved substantially over the years as wartime 
controls were progressively dismantled and private financial networks reestab- 
lished. Given the other rigidities in the system and the importance of govern- 
ments’ domestic goals, imperfect government credibility, with respect both to 
exchange rates and to payments barriers, ensured that the evolution of credit 
markets would undermine rather than support governments in their attempts 
to maintain fixed rates. 
The process was a circular one. The adjustment mechanisms built into the 
Bretton Woods system, other than currency realignment, were both slow and 
costly in political terms. Without stabilizing capital flows, these mechanisms 
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markets became more integrated after the return to convertibility in December 
1958, government ministers were thus forced to forswear realignment ever 
more vigorously. These promises often were not believed and, in part because 
they were not believed, often could not be kept. 
Was  the Bretton Woods regime doomed by  inherent design flaws or by 
faulty operation? In a sense, the question is badly framed: a well-designed 
system should provide incentives that ensure successful operation. Bretton 
Woods was originally intended to function in a world characterized by sticky 
nominal prices and very low capital mobility. Its design fully recognized the 
new primacy of domestic employment objectives and attempted to reconcile 
this political reality with a rules-governed exchange-rate system and a return 
to free multilateral trade. To this end, the Bretton Woods agreement provided 
official credits to allow breathing space for adjustment. The powerful instru- 
ment of currency realignment was also made available, but only as an escape 
from “fundamental disequilibrium.” World  price-level stability was suppos- 
edly ensured by  the system’s central nominal anchor, the $35.00 an ounce 
price of gold. 
This system served reasonably well until the early 1960s to accommodate 
national goals within a framework of  orderly exchange-rate adjustment and 
expanding trade. Its design proved increasingly incompatible with changes in 
the world economy over the 1960s, however, and a critical modification to the 
original plan-the  two-tier gold market-undermined  stability further. 
Two destabilizing design characteristics were the lack of  effective adjust- 
ment incentives for surplus countries and the peculiar difficulty of devaluing 
the dollar. Germany’s aversion to inflation, for example, shifted more of the 
burden of  relative-price adjustment onto its trading partners. The need for a 
dollar devaluation became increasingly apparent over the 1960s, particularly 
in the light of relatively low U.S. productivity growth. But the dollar’s central 
role as a reserve currency made devaluation problematic. 
The Triffin problem would not have arisen had the United States been will- 
ing to gear monetary policy to maintaining the market price of gold at $35  .OO 
per ounce. Perhaps a third design flaw of  Bretton Woods was its failure to 
provide a nominal anchor better suited both to stabilize the general price level 
and to command widespread public support. Electorates had little understand- 
ing of gold’s role in the Bretton Woods system: to them, the price of gold was 
an esoteric aspect of international finance, with little effect on everyday life. 
A more visible, more consequential anchor might have served better to brake 
the damaging expansionary policies that the United States followed after the 
mid- 1960s. 
The main problem, however, was the absence of  a practicable adjustment 
mechanism other than the exchange rate itself. An adjustable exchange-rate 
peg can work in a world of  strictly limited capital mobility, but,  as world 
capital markets evolved after the  return  to convertibility, this increasingly 
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system collapsed in stages in the early 1970s as speculative capital flows pro- 
moted unmanageable worldwide reserve growth.  In Keynes’s words (1971, 
299), the presence of  a “mobile  element, highly  sensitive to outside influ- 
ences,” proved explosively incompatible with the rigidities and political real- 
ities of the first postwar international monetary system. 
Appendix A 
A Model of Adjustment 
Here  I briefly sketch  a dynamic sticky-wage model  of  adjustment  for a 
small open economy with a fixed exchange rate. The model illustrates (1) the 
adjustment to long-run balance from a position of “fundamental disequilib- 
rium” and (2) how a devaluation can shorten the process. 
In this appendix, all variables other than the domestic and foreign nominal 
interest rates (i, i*) are expressed as natural logarithms. Those variables are 
the domestic-currency price of foreign exchange (e),  the domestic and foreign 
GDP deflators (p,  p*),  the domestic money wage (w),  real and potential do- 
mestic output (y, yq, and the domestic nominal money supply (m).  The ex- 
change rate is fixed, and the equations of the model are as follows (where the 
operator D  denotes a time derivative and perfect foresight is assumed): 
(-41)  equality of  aggregate demand and output: 
y(t) = 8[e + p* -  p(t)] - u[i(t) -  aDp(t)l + u; 
P(t) = XW  + (1 - x)  (e + P*) + P[Y(t) -  yfl; 
(‘42)  markup equation: 
643)  expectations-augmented Phillips curve: 
DWM = e[Y(t) - 91  + a  DPW; 
(A4)  money-market equilibrium: 
m(t) -  ap(t) - (1 - a)  (e + p*) = +y(t) - hi(t); 
perfect capital mobility with exchange-rate credibility: 
i(t) = i*. 
(A5) 
Assumption (A5) makes the model a limiting special case; but I will point 
out how relaxing this assumption would change the results.  The model as- 
sumes that the money wage, w,  is sticky in the short run; it thus allows short- 
as well as long-run fluctuations in the real wage. The key to the model is the 
pricing equation (A2), which states that the price of domestic output is a pro- 
cyclical  markup  over  the  cost  of  labor  and  imported  intermediate  goods. 
Equation (A2) allows the specification of a Phillips curve, (A3), with two vital 
properties.  It is free of  money  illusion (unlike the specification of  gradual 249  The Adjustment Mechanism 
price  adjustment  in  Dombusch  [  1976]),  and  it  implies  unconditionally 
(saddle-path) stable dynamics (as does the specification of price adjustment in 
Mussa [  19771). Both a,  the elasticity of the consumer price index with respect 
to the price of domestic output, and x, the long-run share of labor cost in the 
price of domestic output, are strictly between zero and one. 
pf = e + p* -  (u/6)i* + (u -  yf)/6, 
wf  = e + p* -  (u/tiX)i* + (u -  yf)/Sx, 
mf=  e + p* -  (A + au//6)i*  + au/S + (4 -  a/S)yf. 




Then rewrite (Al)  in the form 
(A9)  DpW  = (a/au)[p(t)  -  pfl + (1/4[~(0  -  fly 
DP(Q = XDWW + @Y(t). 
rze + (1 + ps)/u 








Combine (A3) with (A9) and (A2) to obtain 
DW(~)  = r[y(t) - y] + n[w(t) -  W~I. 
Dy(t)  = (l/ap)[(1 - ~X)F  -  WYW  -  Y~I 
Substitution of (A9), (A2), and (A13) into (A10) yields 
+ (R/ap)(l -  aX)[w(t) - wf]. 
The dynamic system consisting of  (A13) and (A14) is linear. Because the 
product of its characteristic roots is -  OR/ap < 0, the system is saddle-path 
stable; that is, it is characterized by a unique convergent path. Figure 4A.1 
depicts the dynamics of the model for the case in which (1 -  ax)T - 8 < 0. 
(When the opposite inequality holds, the locus Dy  = 0 has a negative slope.) 
The stable saddle-path SS is described by the equation 
(A 15) 
where 6 is the negative root of the characteristic equation 
y -  Yf  = [(5 -  Wrl(w - wf), 
x* - {n + (uap)[(i -  aX)r - ellx - (en/ap)  = 0. 
An exogenous permanent fall in aggregate demand [u in (Al)] reduces the 
long-run domestic-output price level, money wage, and money supply-see 
(A6)-(A8)-but  it leaves long-run output unchanged at yf. The long-run real 250  Maurice Obstfeld 
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sticky nominal wage 
Adjustment to full employment with a fixed exchange rate and 
wage falls as well. In terms of figure 4A.2, the long-run equilibrium moves 
from point 1 to point 2, and there is an immediate fall in output, to y(0).  The 
money stock falls discretely as well since p and y have fallen. (With imperfect 
capital mobility, the money stock and output would drop less on impact, and 
the domestic nominal interest rate would fall in the short run.) 
If  no further changes occur, wages will decline, and output will rise over 
time. The money price of domestic output may undershoot or overshoot its 
eventual level in the short run. Overshooting occurs when the impact contrac- 
tion of  output is sharp and the markup is highly responsive to aggregate de- 
mand; in this case, p  rises,  despite falling wages,  as the economy  adjusts 
following  the  shock.  In  the  more  plausible  undershooting  case,  however, 
p  falls during the adjustment process,  albeit  more  slowly than the money 
wage falls. 
The nominal money supply m  also falls on impact. If m does not overshoot 
its long-run level, it will continue to fall as the economy travels toward its 
stationary point. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition form to undershoot 
in response to an aggregate-demand shock is that p undershoot. Under imper- 
fect capital mobility, however, the nominal money supply will be “stickier” in 
the short run, and it is therefore more likely that the money supply will fall 
during the transition from the immediate postshock short-run equilibrium to 
the new long-run position. That is, it is more likely that, absent contractionary 
domestic-credit  policies,  the  transition  process  will  entail  a  continuing 
balance-of-payments deficit. 
We can think of the economy in figure 4A.2 as being in a state of funda- 
mental  disequilibrium, particularly if the adjustment process is slow.  Con- 251  The Adjustment Mechanism 
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Fig. 4.A.2  Impact and long-run effects of a fall in aggregate demand 
sider, however, the effects of devaluing the currency, that is, raising e by the 
amount Ae  =  -Au/Sx  (a positive quantity because  AM  < 0). This action 
leaves the long-run money wage at its preshock level, w{,  but it jumps the 
price of domestic output by -  (1 -  x)Au/Gx > 0; it thus leaves the economy 
in long-run equilibrium with a higher stock of reserves. (With imperfect cap- 
ital mobility, there would be an adjustment period with high domestic interest 
rates.) 
Notice that the devaluation brings a one-time increase in the overall price 
level of (1 -  ax)Ae  percent, but it does not set off a period of domestic-price 
inflation. The reason is that the money supply is being increased, not when 
the economy is at full employment, but at a time when it would otherwise 
suffer a reserve drain. 
Appendix B 
The Data 
This appendix describes sources for the data underlying the paper’s tables 
and figures. 
Table 4.  I.  Inflation rates are annual average compound rates of change in 
GNP deflators. The U.S.  GNP deflator is taken from Economic Report ofthe 
President (February 1991, 290). GNP deflators for Germany and Japan come 
from the data set used in Bordo (chap.  1 in this volume)-which  I refer to 
henceforth as the Bordo data. (I am  grateful to Michael Bordo for making 252  Maurice Obstfeld 
these data available.) Labor-productivity and capital productivity growth rates 
are from Maddison (1987,684, 656, respectively). 
Table 4.2. Covered interest differentials relative to the United States are 
defined  by  d, = 100 x  ((1 + iy)>*  - [(FJE,)(l + i:)I4}.  Here,  interest 
rates are expressed at quarterly rates and are end-of-month three-month Trea- 
sury bill  rates. Forward exchange rates are ninety-day end-of-month rates, 
expressed in U.S. cents per foreign currency unit.  Spot exchange rates are 
end-of-month rates, expressed in cents per foreign currency unit. Data have a 
monthly frequency and are taken from the RATS OECD data base. (As noted 
in the text, the October 1967 dollar-sterling forward rate has been changed to 
277.62 U.S. cents per pound.) 
Table 4.3. All regressions in this table are based on the Bordo data. Price 
levels are  GNP deflators  (GDP deflator  for France,  NNP deflator for the 
United Kingdom). Output is real GNP (real GDP for France, real NNP for the 
United Kingdom). Money stocks are MI  (France, Japan), M2 (Germany, the 
United States), M3 (Italy, United Kingdom). Data frequency is annual. 
Figure 4.1. International reserves are quarterly data on gold plus foreign- 
exchange holdings, in billions of deutsche marks, measured at end of quarter. 
Data  to  December  1951  come  from  Statistiches  Handbuch  der  Bunk 
Deutscher Lander,  1948-54  (SH), table VII-2.  Figures up  to March  1952 
originally were reported in U.S. dollars but were converted to deutsche marks 
at the rate of 4.2 marks per dollar. Figures from March 1952 are from Monthly 
Report of  the Bank Deutscher Lander and Monthly Report of  the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (MRDB),  January and July issues. Money stock is M1, measured 
quarterly at end of quarter. Data come from IMF, Znternatiunal Financial Sta- 
tistics (ZFS), line 50 until the July  1955 issue, line 24 thereafter. Data after 
March 1957 are series 34 from theZFS tape. 
Figures 4.2-4.3.  Real exchange-rate index for country i  is calculated as 
(Xi  -+  IIjX!’”)  x  100,  where  j  runs  over  Australia,  Belgium,  Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan,  the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, and Xi  is series 13 (price level of 
GDP) from the Penn World Table (Mark 5). (See Summers and Heston 1991  .) 
Nominal exchange-rate index for country i is calculated as IIjE:”2 -+  Ei  and 
multiplied by  an arbitrary scaling factor, where Ei  is series 17 (the domestic- 
currency price of the U.S. dollar) from the Penn World Table. 
Figure 4.4. Monthly data on German sixty- to ninety-day Treasury bill in- 
terest rates come from SH, table IV-lb (1949-53), and from MRDB thereafter 
(July issue, odd years). Rates are those prevailing on the date nearest the end 
of the month. Monthly data on ninety-day U.S. Treasury bill rates are an un- 
weighted average of  tender rates on new bills issued within the period and 
come from ZFS. 
Figure 4.5. Monthly data on U.K. ninety-one day Treasury bill interest 
rates are weighted averages from ZFS. U.S. Treasury bill rate data are the same 
as those in Figure 4.4. 253  The Adjustment Mechanism 
Figure 4.6.  Monthly data on twenty-four month German government bond 
interest rates come from SH,  table IV-lb (1953-54),  and from MRDB there- 
after (July issue, odd years). Rates are those prevailing on the date nearest the 
end of the month. Monthly data on U.S. three-year government bond rates are 
period averages from ZFS. 
Figure 4.7. Monthly data on U.K. twenty-year  government bond interest 
rates are averages of daily quotations from ZFS. Monthly data on U.S. twenty- 
year government bond rates are period averages from ZFS. 
Figures 4.8-4.9. Data are the differentials d,, constructed as described in 
equation (8) on the basis of the  data underlying the regressions in table 4.2 
(see table 4.2 data description above). 
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Comment  Robert Z. Aliber 
The invitation to participate in this conference was most welcome for several 
reasons. The obvious one is the interest in the set of questions discussed in 
many of these papers. The less obvious is that visiting Bretton Woods is like 
coming home; I was born not very far from here, and over the years I’ve hiked 
and skied and camped in these hills. This past August-five  or six weeks 
ago-my  son and I climbed Mt. Washington on a day that started bright and 
attractive. The clouds came down as we got to the timberline, and by the time 
we got to the top we were damp and cold. After we got to the bottom of the 
mountain, we came to this marvelous Edwardian hotel for a warm drink and 
some nostalgia. 
An  auction was underway as we entered the hotel lobby. Apparently, the 
hotel had been acquired by the Resolution Trust Corporation when it took over 
the Elliot Savings Bank in Boston, one of the many failed thrift institutions in 
New England. And, presumably, Elliot Savings had acquired this hotel when 
the previous owner had failed to adhere to the terms of the mortgage. 
The Boston Globe reported that the winning bid at the auction was about $3 
million and that the mortgage debt was about $9 million. 
As we drove back to Vermont, we  began to speculate on the number of 
times the owners of this hotel-and  many other grand hotels-have  gone 
bankrupt since the buildings were a dream in the eyes of  the builder. This 
hotel probably went bankrupt in 1921 and again in the Great Depression. The 
hotel was closed for four or five years during World War 11,  and so it probably 
went bankrupt again. 
Despite the history of serial bankruptcies, new entrepreneurs bid and invest 
funds to buy these hotels from the mortgagors. The mortgage holders may 
feel squeezed by the low price offered by  these winning bidders in the auc- 
tions, but they are probably happy to find a new buyer and return to the lend- 
ing business from the hotel management business. 
The bids of  those participating in the auction almost certainly reflect the 
difficulties that the previous owners have had in making a go of the property. 
And the new mortgagor also knows this history. Still, each party enters into 
the new mortgage contract in the hope of improving its own economic posi- 
tion. And both the price of the winning bid and the terms of the new mortgage 
contract almost certainly reflect the views of both parties about the prospec- 
tive economic conditions. 
This series of mortgage contracts is a metaphor for monetary constitutions. 
Countries adhere to the terms of the constitutions for some time, just as bor- 
rowers fulfill the terms of the mortgage contract. But then the economic en- 
vironment changes sharply in an unanticipated way, and the constitution is no 
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longer compatible with contemporary economic values. French constitutions 
are another metaphor; there have been five in the last hundred years. 
When the program for this conference arrived, the similarity to the program 
of  the conference organized by  Bob Mundell twenty-five years ago became 
striking: the papers written for that conference and the discussion appeared as 
Monetary Problems of  the International Economy.  The topics of some of the 
sessions at the two conferences are virtually identical-the  adjustment prob- 
lem, the liquidity problem, the crisis problem. Moreover, there was a parallel 
format-younger  scholars  would  write  the  papers,  and  those  no  longer 
“younger” would comment; I’ve come full circle in twenty-five years. 
The papers twenty-five years ago were directed toward prolonging the life 
of  the Bretton Woods system, with much attention to balance of  payments 
adjustment and the adequacy of reserves; by  1966, there was a sense of persis- 
tent  and nonsustainable disequilibrium. The papers for this conference are 
retrospective by design. (There is a striking difference in the style of the pa- 
pers; there was very little empirical work in the papers for the 1966 confer- 
ence .) 
Bob Mundell had assigned Egon Sohmen and Ron McKinnon to write pa- 
pers on the adjustment problem. Egon wrote on the fit of targets and instru- 
ments and presented a persuasive case that this fit would be easier under a 
floating exchange rate regime. Ron developed a portfolio balance model to 
analyze the persistent payments imbalances. Harry Johnson, in his then tradi- 
tional role as the conference summarizer, spoke about the need to move away 
from simple models of  adjustment based on the Keynesian assumptions and 
the need to integrate the analysis of determinants of consumption and invest- 
ment decisions with the analysis of balance of payments adjustment. 
Maury  Obstfeld has  caught the  spirit of  Harry’s  advice.  The theme of 
Obstfeld’s ambitious paper is the fit between the adjustment mechanism and 
the adequacy of reserves in the Bretton Woods system. The paper is a series 
of  vignettes on this theme. The paper starts with several quotes that suggest 
that there was no adjustment mechanism under the Bretton Woods system, 
and the reader-at  least this reader-infers  that this view will be challenged. 
Then five aspects of the adjustment problem are identified-which  accounts 
are to be adjusted or targeted, the definition of fundamental equilibrium and 
fundamental disequilibrium, the economic variables for adjustment to imbal- 
ances such as relative prices and relative incomes, the mechanisms of  adjust- 
ment to different shocks, and whether the surplus and the deficit countries 
faced symmetric pressures to adjust and whether the reserve currency coun- 
tries faced special privileges or constraints. 
1. R.  A. Mundell and A. K. Swoboda, eds.,  Monetary Problems of the International Economy 
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The paper is divided into eight sections. Section 4.1 relates the adjustment 
and the liquidity problem in the context of the Bretton Woods system, seeking 
the answer to the first question; Maury concludes that the definition of exter- 
nal equilibrium should be in terms of the changes in the net government hold- 
ings of general acceptable means of payment. 
Section 4.2 develops a two-country model of the world economy in a world 
without any market frictions; the major conclusions are that changes in  ex- 
change rates are unnecessary as a means of  adjustment and that reserves are 
unnecessary as a means of financing imbalances. Funds for financing imbal- 
ances will be automatically available as long as the government in the deficit 
country retains the confidence of the lenders. One explicit assumption is this 
model; a second is that the real exchange rate is constant. And  an implicit 
assumption is that the government in the deficit country is willing to adopt the 
measures to retain the confidence of the lenders. 
Section 4.3 reviews the operation of the gold standard and concludes that 
the direction of capital movements accommodated rather than constrained de- 
velopments in the real economy. Maury notes the massive volume of  capital 
flows from Great Britain and other European countries. He suggests that cen- 
tral bank solidarity in supporting parities helped maintain the gold standard, 
although there is little discussion in the paper about the measures adopted by 
central banks in the exchange or financial crises. Maury does not discuss why 
the gold standard broke down and the possible parallel-if  any-to  the break- 
down of the Bretton Woods arrangements. 
Section 4.4  seems twinned to the fourth and deals with adjustment and 
capital flows under the Bretton Woods system; much attention is given to 
1950s and 1960s models of the adjustment process. Maury discusses the role 
of the currency realignment option and the asymmetric position of the deficit 
countries that must adjust while the surplus countries can sterilize reserve in- 
flows and delay adjustment. Maury shows that Germany frustrated the opera- 
tion of the adjustment mechanism by sterilizing a significant part of its reserve 
inflows. 
The parity realignment option is discussed in section 4.5, with the general 
conclusion that governments in the  1950s  and the  1960s  rarely  found the 
changes in their parities an attractive option-in  all cases the changes were 
forced by the market. 
Maury examines changes in the scope of capital market integration by pre- 
senting some data on the correlation of interest rate movements in section 4.6; 
he concludes that capital mobility was imperfect but increasing. Capital mo- 
bility is measured by differentials in interest rates on similar securities denom- 
inated in different currencies-there  is only a modest comparison with capital 
mobility under the gold standard using the same tests. 
Section 4.7 provides a comparison between price level flexibility in the 
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nominal price inflexibility seems to have increased after World War 11.  The 
significance of the increase in nominal price inflexibility for the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system is not considered. 
The central conclusion in Maury’s paper is that the adjustment mechanisms 
in the Bretton Woods system were slow and costly in political terms and that 
these mechanisms had too little time to be effective in the absence of stabiliz- 
ing  capital  flows,  which  were  generally  stabilizing but  insufficiently so. 
Somehow this insufficiency of reserves seems linked to the realignment option 
in a way that is never made quite explicit-although  it appears to involve the 
concern with capital losses should a parity be changed. The reader has a sense 
of the shortcomings of the adjustment mechanism in the Bretton Woods sys- 
tem but is left wondering why the system actually broke down. 
Because the paper doesn’t identify the cause or causes of the collapse of the 
system, the whole seems less than the sum of its parts. Maury ends up close 
to the critics he cites who said that the Bretton Woods system lacked an ad- 
justment mechanism, at least as far as the countries with the payments deficit 
are concerned; the supply of official reserves or perhaps, more appropriately, 
the rate of growth of reserve assets was too small relative to the pace of  the 
adjustment mechanism. The puzzle is between the evidence that Maury cites 
about  increasing integration of  financial markets  and  his-and  many  oth- 
ers’-concern  about  too  small a  level of  international reserve assets; the 
greater the integration of national financial markets, the smaller the need for 
official reserves, even with a currency realignment option. 
Consider the parity changes for the industrial countries in the post-1949 
period. Perhaps some of these changes were necessary because of  a shortage 
of reserves; in most cases, the currencies of  the countries that devalued had 
become overvalued because of more rapid increases in their prices levels than 
in the price levels in the countries with whom they did most of their trading, 
and partly because of  the productivity spurts in Germany and Japan. These 
devaluations occurred even though the supply of  international reserves was 
increasing at a relatively rapid rate-thanks  to the persistent U.S. payments 
deficit. And the speculation about the revaluation of the German mark helped 
trigger part of the adjustment that Germany was stalling through its efforts at 
monetary sterilization. 
The underlying changes in national competitiveness in Great Britain and 
Germany-and  presumably in Japan-as  a result of real or nonmonetary fac- 
tors-were  large, too large to be accommodated by changes in national price 
levels within the context of  the Bretton Woods system of  pegged exchange 
rates. 
The breakdown of Bretton Woods can be attributed to the shortcomings of 
the adjustment mechanism noted by Maury and others and to the inadequacies 
of  reserves-although  it  is not  clear that  the breakdown could  have been 
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given both the monetary and the structural shocks, the German and Japanese 
desire to sterilize their reserve inflows, and the U.S. desire to ignore an exter- 
nal constraint in the development of its domestic financial policy. 
The date of no return for the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system was 
at least no later than March 1968 and the move to the two-tier gold system: 
this institutional change had the dual effect of both immobilizing gold in offi- 
cial reserves and increasing the reluctance of  investors to acquire securities 
denominated in the U.S.  dollar. Hence, market participants were concerned 
that changes in parities were not unlikely. 
While one of Maury’s five questions is whether the countries with the pay- 
ments surpluses or the countries with the payments deficits should adjust, and 
another is whether there were special privileges or special constraints on the 
reserve currency countries, his paper is almost mute on the unique U.S. ad- 
justment problems in response to a persistent payments deficit, although he 
mentions the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar as a result of the 1949 devalua- 
tions of  the currencies of the countries in Western Europe and its somewhat 
lesser overvaluation in 1970-despite  the higher U. S. inflation rate in the late 
1960s. 
Three particular adjustment questions centered on the United States can be 
identified-one  involves how  the United  States should have adjusted (and 
presumably if it should have adjusted) if the persistent U.S. payments deficit 
could be attributed to the foreign demand for reserve assets (a “beggar-thy- 
neighbor” approach to the demand for reserve assets, which describes the sit- 
uation until the mid-1960s) and if the foreign official institutions were unwill- 
ing to reduce their demand for reserve assets or to agree to an increase in the 
supply of  some other reserve assets. This competitive scramble for interna- 
tional reserve assets could reflect differences among countries in the accept- 
able levels of changes in the national price levels. 
The second  specific U.S.  adjustment problem involves how  the United 
States should have adjusted to a real shock-to  the decline in the growth of 
domestic demand in Germany and Japan and the resulting surge in their trade 
and payments surpluses. The currencies of these countries had been pegged 
in 1949 at levels that reflected the lack of their productive capacity rather than 
the levels of prices and costs. As long as their domestic demand was expand- 
ing rapidly, their imports increased almost as rapidly as their exports. Growth 
rates within these countries slowed as their domestic demand was increasingly 
satisfied, and their trade and payments surpluses increased sharply. 
The third specific U.S. adjustment question involves how the United States 
should have adjusted to a persistent U.S. payments deficit attributable to the 
more rapid inflation in the United States than in its major trading partners, if 
these countries were reluctant to revalue or to stop pegging their currencies to 
the U.S. dollar. Did the United States have the same realignment option that 
other countries had, or was the U.S. realignment option handicapped, either 
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role  in  world trade? To  the extent that there  was a handicap, was  it self- 
imposed? 
The Bretton Woods system worked as long as the United States could fi- 
nance its payments deficits. The system broke down when two shocks oc- 
curred at about the same time in the late 1960s-the  United States began to 
inflate at about the same time as Germany and Japan developed substantial 
excess capacity because of  a slowdown in domestic growth-a  combination 
of events that must have seemed stranger than fiction at Bretton Woods. 
The structures of both the Mundell conference and this conference follow the 
functional approach introduced by Fritz Machlup nearly thirty years ago- 
there is a three-part distinction among the adjustment problem, the liquidity 
problem, and the crisis or confidence problem. This distinction implicitly fol- 
lows the United Nations approach that each country counts for one, regardless 
of population, national income, industrial structure, and scope of government 
in the economy. The underlying economic reality that was  reflected in the 
Bretton Woods negotiations-that  two or three countries had and would have 
all the economic clout at least for the foreseeable future-was  largely ignored 
in the Bretton Woods rules, except for weighted voting based on quotas. The 
economic parameters of  each country differ significantly-and  the test of  a 
monetary constitution is its ability to accommodate these differences in a legal 
structure that assumes each country is one among equals when the economic 
weights of countries differ sharply. 
Two questions merit discussion in conclusion. The first involves whether 
the breakdown of  Bretton Woods was a result of  the failure of  design or the 
failure of management. The second involves the purpose of monetary consti- 
tutions in general and of the Bretton Woods Agreement in particular. 
Consider the design versus management distinction. No committee met at 
Mt.  Washington  or  Mt.  Pelerin  to  design the  gold  standard; the  system 
evolved, and membership was  voluntary, stimulated by  the self-interest of 
capital importing countries to reduce their net borrowing costs. In contrast, 
the bet at Bretton Woods was that a monetary system could be legislated that 
could  accommodate domestically oriented monetary and  financial policies 
within the exchange market arrangements of  the gold standard. At one level, 
this design versus management question might be thought redundant, for the 
architects might have developed an arrangement that even the most timid of 
managers, sensitive to the various domestic and foreign political constraints, 
could have operated. 
Consider one basic  design failure-the  system of  permissible gold han- 
dling, charges, and currency support limits, which were so narrow that they 
reduced the scope for stabilizing capital flows and reinforced the virtually 
costless one-way speculative option available to investors who wanted to bet 
that parities might be changed. It’s as if the policy community that met at this 
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foreign exchange and international money markets-which  is puzzling given 
some of the arguments advanced by Keynes in The Tract on Monetary Reform 
and The Treatise on Money. A second design failure was the lack of recogni- 
tion that the currency realignment option would be very different in a world 
with convertibility on capital account than in a world with exchange controls 
on capital flows; a convertible currency world requires a much wider range 
for the movement of  the market exchange rate within the currency support 
limits. Similarly, consistency suggests that, if the currency realignment option 
was to be taken seriously, much wider support limits were necessary. A third 
design failure was the lack of a mechanism that gave the United States a cur- 
rency realignment option comparable to the one available to other countries- 
a mechanism that would permit the United States to alter the foreign exchange 
value of the U.S. dollar without affecting the U.S. dollar price of gold. 
Consider some of  the management failures. One management failure was 
the adoption of the two-tier gold system, at least if the U.S. authorities wanted 
to extend the life of the Bretton Woods system; this system had the perverse 
result of  signaling the increased llkelihood of changes in parities. A second 
management failure was the U.S. reluctance to raise the U.S. dollar price of 
gold because of a set of specious political and economic objections; such an 
increase (which had been contemplated by  Keynes in one version of the plan 
for the International Clearing Union) would have led to an immediate increase 
in the supply of  reserves and a more rapid increase in the rate of  growth of 
reserves and also effected a change in the foreign exchange value of the U.S. 
dollar. The markets forced the changes in the U.S. gold parity in a much more 
costly way-and,  once the United States no longer had to be concerned with 
an external constraint, more expansive monetary policies could be and were 
adopted. 
The concluding observation concerns the purpose of monetary constitutions 
in general and of Bretton Woods in particular. One view-probably  the ma- 
jority view-is  that Bretton Woods was about designing a monetary system 
for all time, both to accomplish the postwar transition without the instability 
noted by Nurkse in International Currency Experience2 and then to be effec- 
tive in the posttransition period. The purpose of a monetary constitution is to 
reduce the uncertainties about exchange rates, payments controls, and foreign 
credits for the next twenty or thirty years. A major purpose of  the Bretton 
Woods rules was to avoid a repetition of what was viewed as the chaos of the 
interwar period-the  volatility of exchange rates, the hyperinflations in Cen- 
tral Europe, the development of trading blocs, and the reliance on exchange 
controls. Bretton Woods complemented Lend Lease and the decision not to 
levy reparations on Germany once again. The implication is that the negotia- 
tors at Bretton Woods probably were much more concerned with the develop- 
ment of the set of rules that would be effective during an extended postwar 
2. R.  Nurkse, International Currency Experience (Geneva:  League of Nations, 1944). 264  Maurice Obstfeld 
transitional period and far less concerned about the rules for the posttransition 
period. If  we look at the results-the  growth in world income and trade in the 
twenty-five years from  1945 through  1970, the integration of  Germany and 
Japan into the world economy-Bretton  Woods proved to be  a brilliant ar- 
rangement. 
Comment  Vittorio u.  Grilli 
Bretton Woods’s adjustment mechanism at the end proved to be inadequate. 
The mechanics of  the collapse of  the system and its repercussions are well 
known. Opinion regarding the causes is still divided. It may seem futile to 
argue now, more than twenty years later, whether or not the system was badly 
designed and therefore doomed from its inception. This is, however, an im- 
portant issue since this episode carries important lessons for the future devel- 
opment of  international monetary arrangements. The process toward a Euro- 
pean Monetary Union is accelerating, and it is reaching the point at which 
irreversible decisions have to be made about the structure of institutions and 
regulations. An error in design can prove fatal to this endeavor. 
Obstfeld’s paper is a valuable contribution in this respect. It provides a lucid 
framework in which to organize and evaluate the numerous facts and eco- 
nomic theories that are relevant to the discussion. While he does not take a 
strong final view on the issue, Obstfeld seems to oppose the view that Bretton 
Woods collapsed because of design flaws as overly simplistic. He argues that 
the system permitted substantial room for adjustment by  providing official 
credit facilities and by  allowing exchange rate realignments. He maintains 
that these two sets of  instruments were sufficient to guarantee the  smooth 
functioning of the system in the world economy it had been designed for, that 
is, one characterized by sticky prices and low capital mobility. The adjustment 
mechanism imbedded in the system became inadequate only after changes in 
the international financial markets that had not been  foreseen. What were 
these changes, and why couldn’t Bretton Woods cope with them? 
In order to determine the causes of the Bretton Woods system’s failure to 
survive the evolution of  the world markets, we need to understand why an 
adjustment mechanism is necessary in the first place. Why don’t international 
financial and monetary markets adjust automatically, without the need for ex- 
plicit  policy  intervention  and  coordination?  Following  this  reasoning, 
Obstfeld considers the benchmark case of a world without frictions or rigidi- 
ties of  any  sort.  By  construction,  in this environment, no current account 
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problem can arise, and liquidity shortages are unknown. This is not surpris- 
ing. The interesting question, however, is to identify which frictions and rig- 
idities are the most likely to generate serious balance of payments problems. 
Obstfeld identifies two: (i) nominal price rigidities and (ii) low capital mobil- 
ity, He also argues convincingly that the adjustment problems introduced by 
these imperfections were amplified by the nature of  the policy response that 
was  supposed to counterbalance them.  In particular, the possibility of  ex- 
change rate realignments, even as measures of  last resort,  undermined the 
public confidence in the system’s ability to provide long-run monetary sta- 
bility. 
The adjustment problems of  the Bretton Woods period contrast with the 
smooth workings of the gold standard. Obstfeld indicates two main reasons 
for the success of the classical gold standard. First is the clear British financial 
leadership in the gold standard, which provided the credibility that the Bretton 
Woods  system subsequently lacked. Second is the high degree of  financial 
integration before World War I, which ensured that capital movement would 
quickly balance the current account without the need for major movements in 
official reserves. When tensions did arise, they were resolved through central 
bank solidarity and, in some cases, even by the explicit cooperation of private 
financial institutions. 
An  illuminating example is provided  using the early  1890s. This was a 
period in which the ability of the dollar to remain on the gold standard was 
seriously threatened, primarily because of  the introduction of  the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act and the McKinley Tariff Act in 1890. In fact, both acts 
caused, for different reasons, an abrupt fall in U.S. gold reserves, below the 
required  minimum level. This severely jeopardized the ability of  the U.S. 
Treasury to maintain the gold convertibility of  the dollar. The resolution of 
the crisis was provided by the collaboration between private financial institu- 
tions and the U.S. Treasury. Organized in a syndicate by August Belmont and 
J. P.  Morgan, the major financial institutions of the time were able to provide 
the U.S. Treasury with a sufficient amount of gold to survive the crises, until 
the disruptive effects of  the two acts faded away.  The syndicate raised the 
necessary gold abroad, mainly in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in continental 
Europe, which highlights the extent of  the links between the various national 
financial markets and the high degree of capital mobility between them. 
The Bretton Woods system could not count on the same well-established 
international financial network. This network had been shattered by two world 
wars and everything that happened in between. At the end of World War  11, 
the legal framework and the level of  confidence in the system necessary to 
sustain efficient financial markets did not exist any longer. Obstfeld provides 
suggestive evidence that financial markets were, indeed, segmented during 
the Bretton Woods period and that international capital mobility was, espe- 
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on findings of persistent violation of international interest rate parity. It is no 
surprise, then, that the adjustment of external imbalances could not occur as 
smoothly as during the gold standard. 
Moreover, contrary to the benchmark frictionless world, prices and wages 
were more downward rigid than they had been in the pre-World  War I1 period. 
As I mentioned above, in order to facilitate the adjustment process under these 
conditions, Bretton Woods provided two policy tools: the use of capital con- 
trols and the change in the exchange rate parity. However, if one of the main 
problems for the viability of  the system was the degree of  segmentation of 
international financial markets,  the  imposition of  capital controls does not 
seem to be the right remedy. A resort to capital controls, while attractive in 
the short run,  shows a lack of  foresight in the design of  the system. This 
approach failed to take into consideration the effects that capital controls, in 
turn, have on the development of international capital markets. Capital con- 
trols, in fact, make the process of  reconstructing the international financial 
network all the more difficult. Therefore, one of  the tools provided by  the 
system to facilitate short-term adjustment might have been responsible for the 
inability of the system to adjust in the long run. 
The other policy instrument during Bretton Woods was exchange rate re- 
alignment. As Obstfeld correctly points out, devaluations or revaluations must 
have lasting effects on the real exchange rate in  order to be effective in  re- 
adjusting balance of payment imbalances. He provides evidence that, indeed, 
shocks to the real exchange rate have a high degree of persistence. However, 
one could look at this evidence from another perspective and argue that the 
persistence of real exchange rate shock is what had made devaluations neces- 
sary in the first place. This, I believe, is a crucial point: what is the nature of 
the shocks that the system needs to adjust to? By now, there is ample evidence 
that the degree of persistence of economic shocks has changed over time and 
that it was certainly different during the gold standard than during Bretton 
Woods. Grilli and Kaminsky provide evidence that real exchange rate shocks 
have been much more permanent after World War 11. I  During the prewar pe- 
riod, transitory shocks were the most important source of  fluctuations of the 
real exchange rate. Since World War 11, instead, permanent shocks have been 
the dominating component of real exchange rate variations. Interestingly, this 
change in the stochastic process after World War I1 is not limited to the foreign 
exchange market.  In  fact,  Poterba and  Summers uncover the  presence  of 
strong temporary components in  U.S. stock market prices before  1926, in 
contrast to the period  1926-85,  when returns exhibited very small mean re- 
version at long horizons,  * The approximately simultaneous reduction of the 
importance of transitory components in stock prices and exchange rates sug- 
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gest that this switch in stochastic behavior was part of a more general phenom- 
enon in asset markets. 
This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in several papers 
examining the  stochastic process followed by  interest  rates  in  the  United 
States since 1890. The general finding3 is that only in the post-World  War  I1 
period does the short-term predictability of  nominal interest rate movements 
disappear. During the interwar period, instead, there is evidence of stationar- 
ity and predictability of the nominal interest rate. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the nature of economic shocks 
has changed considerably after World War 11.  This may be one of  the main 
reasons for the failure of Bretton Woods. Without a careful examination, it is 
difficult to  say whether the disappearance of  transitory components in  ex- 
change rates, stock prices, and interest rates is attributable to a common cause 
and what this cause might be. The substantial modifications in fiscal policies 
that have taken place in the last one hundred years might also have been im- 
portant in this respect. For example, the changes in the level of government 
expenditure, in the composition of revenues, and in the use of seigniorage and 
of deficit financing may be partially responsible for the variations in the sto- 
chastic characteristics of the terms of trade and interest rates. 
General Discussion 
One strand of  the discussion focused on the role of  capital mobility in the 
Bretton Woods adjustment mechanism. Dale Henderson argued that the prob- 
lem with Bretton Woods was not capital mobility per se but that capital move- 
ments were not stabilizing. This was because market participants did not have 
clear expectations that adjustment of wages and prices would take place. Wil- 
lem Buiter stressed the importance of  limited capital mobility in the Bretton 
Woods  model of  adjustment posited by  Obstfeld. Barry Eichengreen com- 
pared Bretton Woods to the classical gold standard. He stated that events such 
as the Belmont-Morgan syndicate of  1895 illustrated the importance of  both 
stabilizing capital movements and international cooperation for the successful 
performance of a fixed exchange rate system. 
Both Allan Meltzer and Ronald McKinnon argued that the Bretton Woods 
system worked well until  1970. According to Meltzer, the United States had 
the lowest inflation rate of the G7 countries until 1967, declining relative unit 
labor costs until the mid-l960s,  and a free market gold price of  $35.00 in 
1969-the  latter suggesting the absence of a crisis of confidence in the dollar. 
McKinnon stressed that the dollar standard was very elastic in providing re- 
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serves to the rest of the world. It was more successful than the gold standard 
in this respect because the system was not plagued by  deflation like that of 
the 1870s and  188Os, when, as more and more countries adopted the stan- 
dard, downward pressure was placed on limited monetary gold stocks. For 
McKinnon, the system worked because the United States provided a stable 
common price level. Both discussants agreed that the system could have con- 
tinued with a once-and-for-all correction of the gold dollar problem-Meltzer 
advocated a rise in the price of gold; McKinnon advocated demonetization of 
gold and discipline on U.S. monetary policy. 
Meltzer attributed the breakdown of Bretton Woods to four causes. First is 
mismeasurement of the problem. (The U.S. monetary authorities should have 
focused on the current account balance, which showed a surplus until 1968, 
rather than on broader measures that included U.S. investment abroad. These 
measures ignored the return flow  of  interest and dividends.) Second is the 
creation of the SDR, which Meltzer viewed as unnecessary. Third is the ex- 
plosion of reserves to the rest of the world supplied by  U.S. monetary growth 
in  1970-71,  and fourth is the unwillingness of  surplus countries to revalue 
their currencies. 
Bennett McCallum stressed that, in analyzing the causes of breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, the system should be viewed as a dual standard: a gold-dollar 
standard and a dollar standard. In that context, the breakdown of the gold part 
of the system in 1968 was not surprising. Despite the fact that U.S. inflation 
was low, in the face of cumulative low inflation over twenty-five years the real 
price of gold fell to the point where maintaining the nominal price at $35.00 
per ounce was no longer viable. Robert Aliber argued that the system broke 
down in the face of two big shocks: the real shock of more rapid productivity 
growth  in  Germany  and  Japan  and  the  nominal,  U.S.-induced,  inflation 
shock. 